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ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION,
ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES AND
THE LIMITATIONS OF PRICE
1. INTRODUCTION
Electricity is arguably the central infrastructural clement of mod-
ern society. Powering industrial machine tools, food refrigeration,
building illumination, phone communication, computers, television
and thousands of other devices and processes, electricity's contribution
to 20th century life in developed nations has become indispensable.
Society's interest in reliable, low-cost electricity is thus understandable
and undeniable.
As economists, policy-makers and sometimes even consumers have
realized, however, "cost" is not always fully apparent in the deceivingly
simple, disarmingly determinate figure of price. Low-priced power may
not be the same as low-cost power. By the 1930s, economists began to
acknowledge that, for some activities, certain costs were imposed on
third parties or the public at-large and, consequently were not ade-
quately reflected in the price of that activity) This phenomenon—costs
that elude capture in price—has been analyzed under the term "social
costs," or more recently, "externalities.'" For industries with substantial
environmental impacts, like electricity production, environmental ex-
ternalities can be significant. 3
See, e.g., A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 134, 183-88 (4th ed. 1932).
2 The British economist A.C, Pigou is credited with some of the earliest comprehensive
analysis of external costs, done in the 1930s, and taxes levied on emissions or other externalities
have been named "Pigovian" or "Pigouvian" taxes after hint. See, e.g., Picou, supra note 1, at
183-88; see also R. II. Coast, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 j.L. Sc ECON. 1 (1960) (analysis of
situations where actions of business have harthful effects on others has largely followed analysis
of Pigou); David M. Dricsen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond the Adminis-
trative Cost•benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545,577 (1997) ("Pigovian" externality tax named
after Pigou). In one of the most heavily cited articles in legal scholarship, economist Ronald
Coase dealt generally with the problem of externalities under the rubric of "social cost," treading
similar terrain as Pigou but coming to different conclusions. See Coase, supra, at 29. Coase
concluded that government should not always intervene to force industry to compensate those
injured by the side-effects of industrial activity, and suggested that Pigou came to different
conclusions, See id.
3 See, e.g., infra notes 178-93. By the mid•1970s pollution and pollution control were being
discussed using the terminology of "environmental externalities," a conceptual framework that
has persisted. See, e.g., HIROFUMI SHIBATA & J. STEVEN WINRICII, THE OPTIMAL CONTROL OF
ENVIRONMENTAL ExTER.xsurtEs 5 (1976); Re Integrated Resource Management Practices, D.P.U.
89-239,116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR), 67,87 (Mass, D.P.U. 1990) (hereinafter D.P.U. 89-239].
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Environmental externalities arc the environmental costs to society
of given products that are not reflected in the transaction price for
those products, and that therefore may be imposed on parties not
involved in the transaction or on society as a whole. 4 From the stand-
point of individual corporate accounting, shifting private costs onto
the public is advantageous and leads to apparent corporate efficiencies
because the same revenue now appears to be generated on a smaller
level of expenditures. 5 From a social standpoint, however, allowing
private parties to externalize their costs may lead to overall economic
inefficiencies for society. 6 IF, for example, a coal plant can generate
electricity a million dollars cheaper per year than a gas-fired plant, but
causes a million and a half dollars more in health costs due to coal-in-
duced increases in air pollution, from a society-wide standpoint it is
economically inefficient to invest in coal-fueled electricity generation.''
The value of these environmental externalities is often expressed as
the cost of environmental damages that occur in spite of, or outside
of, legally required mitigation measures. 8 For electricity, these exter-
See generally Pricing and Ratemaking Treatment to Be Afforded New Electric Generating
Facilities Which Arc Not Qualifying Facilities as Defined in 220 C.M.R. § 8.02, D.P.U. 86-36-G,
available in 9 Massachusetts Administrative Law Library, Deparunent of Public Utilities File (Jan.
1998), at 77 (Mass. D.P.U. 1989) [hereinafter D.P.U. 86-36-G] (cost of externalities is cost of
environmental damages caused by activity for which compensation] to affected parties does not
occur; externalities result from production and purchase of product that yields incidental injuries
to third party not directly involved in transaction). When regulations compel a market actor to
account for the externality within the cost of the transaction, for example by installing pollution
control equipment to correct the environmental impact, the social cost is eliminated or reduced
and the externality is said to be "internalized." See generally D.P.U. 86-36-C, at 77; ZyGmuNT
PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 40-41 (1992). The
previously external social cost is now reflected in the costs and prices of the transaction. See
generally D.P.U. 86-36-G, at 77; PLATER ET AL., supra.
5 See generally AL GORE, EARTH IN TnE BALANCE 189 (1992) (easy way to increase measured
economic values is at expense of things left outside circle of economic accounting; more pollution
dumped, the higher the short-term profits for polluter and his shareholders); PLATER ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 29 (in absence of legal rule forbidding pollution or requiring payment for
pollution harms, rational producer will not undertake pollution controls because would increase
costs and thereby reduce profits); Garrett llardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243,
1245 (1968) (each rational person finds that his share of the costs of his pollution is less than
his costs for pollution control, so as free enterprisers each is locked into fouling the collective
nest).
6 See, e.g., D.P.U. 89-239, 116 Pub. U0I. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 87; D.P.U. 86-36-G, at 79.
7 See generally D.P.U. 89-239, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 90; CORE, supra note 5, at
190.
8 See, e.g., D.P.U. 89-239, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 90; D.P.U. 86-36-G, at 77. But see
PAUL L. JOSHOW, DEALING WITH ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES: Lt is Do IT RIGHT! 4 (1992)
(incorrect to assume that the price of externalities can be inferred from costs of residual
environmental damages). This Note uses the terms "environmental impacts" and "environmental
externalities" more or less interchangeably, because where such environmental impacts have
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nalities range from damages due to loss of fisheries on a river dammed
for hydropower to the impact of global warming caused, in part, by
fossil-fuel fired electricity production. 9
Costs and prices arc inextricably tied to legal and policy decisions
that determine, for example, the definition and enforcement of prop-
erty rights, the extent of public subsidy, the level of taxation, the
imposition of uniform standards, the thoroughness of regulation, cur-
rency exchange rates and the validity of contracts.'" Along with these
general legal and policy factors, the costs and prices of electricity have
been specifically shaped by the legally determined regulatory frame-
work of the industry." This framework, which coalesced in the early
part of this century and endured for over fifty years, is now being
reexamined and fundamentally restructured.' 2 Because the legal con-
structs affecting electricity's price arc being publicly renegotiated in
the current restructuring debate, this is an opportune moment to
address environmental externalities that have previously eluded cap-
ture in electricity's price.' 3 In doing so we may find that price is not
the only, nor always the best, mechanism for securing all public policy
objectives for this indispensable industry. 14
From the inception of federal electric utility regulation, control
of the environmental impacts of power production has been a concern
of regulation, becoming a significant and clearly articulated objective
since the 19700' The initial governmental approach to regulating
these environmental externalities was to eliminate or restrict them
occurred they have obviously not been successfully contained by required pollution control
practices, and, unless paid for by some other mechanism, have become externalities. See generally
Re Biennial Resource Plan Update Following the California Energy Commission's Seventh Elec-
tricity Report, Decision No. 91-06-022, 124 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 181,189 (Cal. P.U.C. 1991)
(hereinafter Decision No, 91-06-0221 (producers that create pollution have generally not had
to bear all costs of pollution but have instead "externalized" substantial part of those costs to
society). But see jositow, supra note 8, at 3, 12, 13 (arguing it is misleading to equate environ-
mental impacts with externalities; asserting externalities are only those environmental impacts
that could be eliminated cost-effectively).
9 See, e.g., infra note 215,
113 See, e.g., ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FEDERAL ENERGY SUBSIDIES: DIRECT AND INDIRECT INTER-
VENT1ONS IN ENERGY MARKETS 8, 53, 55 (1992); PLATER ET Al.., SUp/TI note 4, at 31.
II See, e.g., LEONARD S. HYMAN, AMERICA'S ELECTRIC UTILITIES: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
143 (1983).
12 See infra notes 33-174 and accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., Congressional testimony to Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
by P. Chrismazt Iribe (Vice Chair, Electric Power Supply Association), Mar. 6, 1997, available in
1997 WL 8220935 (environmental issues arc properly part of restructuring debate).
14 See, e.g., infra notes 335-417 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 33-135 and accompanying text.
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through prohibitions or regulatory licensing schemes.' 6 With increas-
ing regulation of power plant emissions after the passage of the Clean
Air Act in 1970, for example, at least some of these externalized costs
were eliminated; internalized in a price of electricity reflecting the
expense of pollution control equipment needed to eliminate the ex-
ternality.' 7 With growing environmental knowledge, and with a chang-
ing public perception of what is valuable, however, regulators and the
public began to confront the possibility that significant costs caused by
certain types of electricity were still being imposed on society, despite
existing pollution control regulation. 18
This Note explores some of the legal devices being implemented
or considered for reducing these environmental externalities in the
context of the restructuring of the electricity industry. To place the ex-
ternalities and restructuring debate in context, this Note first examines
the co-evolution of two interwoven policy objectives of electric utility
regulation: 1) the search for least-cost power, through regulation and
later through deregulation of the electricity generation system; and,
2) the continued effort to protect environmental objectives through
the organization of power production.' 9 This co-evolution is explored
in the context of key federal regulatory statutes. 2° The reaffirmation of
these twin policy goals—least-cost power and environmental protec-
tion—is then examined in the electricity restructuring statutes of two
states playing a leading role in deregulation, California and Massachu-
setts. 2 '
Second, this Note discusses the environmental externalities in-
volved in electricity generation, using carbon dioxide ("CO2") emis-
sions linked to global warming as representative of an intractable
externality that the market on its own might not address. 22 Third, this
Note looks at possible regulatory mechanisms that could address elec-
tricity generation's CO2 emissions and other externalities, particularly
the mechanisms mandated in provisions of the California and Massa-
16 See, e.g., Clean Air Amendments of 1970 ("Clean Air Act"), Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4, 84
Stat. 1676, 1679, 1680 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a), 7410(a) (1994)).
37 See generally id. § 4, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7411 (1994); see also Jositow, supra note 8, at 8
(emissions limits applied by environmental regulators have been used widely and internalize
externalities).
18 See, e.g., D.P.U. 86.-36•G, at 77.
19 Ste infra notes 33-176 and accompanying text.
2° See infra notes 33-134 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 136-76 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 178-93 and accompanying text.
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chusetts restructuring statutes. 28 Both market-based and non-market-
based mechanisms are examined."
Using the example of CO2 emissions, this Note then analyzes the
advantages and disadvantages of market/price-based approaches to
environmental externalities.25 It explores some of the reasons why price
and the market may have difficulty addressing long-term, world-wide
environmental impacts like global warming. 26 Finally, it suggests that
pursuit of the twin policy objectives of least-cost power and environ-
mental protection may require the express and unapologetic use of
both market and non-market mechanisms in a restructured electricity
industry."
II. BACKGROUND
A. Twin Goals for the Structure of Electricity Generation: Least-Cost
Power and Environmental Protection
Recent public debate on electricity restructuring has focused on
low-cost power as if it were the paramount public objective for the
structure of the industry. 28 Thus, at first glance, lower-cost power might
seem the principal yardstick by which to measure restructuring pro-
posals for the electricity industry.28 In fact, structuring the electricity
industry in a way that protects the environment is also a fundamental
public policy objective, repeatedly affirmed by federal and state legis-
lation, often as an objective co-equal with, or delimiting, least-cost
power. 8° Environmental concerns have played a part in federal electric-
ity regulation from its earliest days, and paradoxically have played a
pivotal, if inadvertent, role in bringing about the movement towards
electricity deregulation.'" Thus, the history of electricity regulation and
deregulation has been determined by both the search for least-cost
22 See infra notes 194-302 and accompanying text.
24 See supra note 23.
25 See infra notes 308-520 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 337-417 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 480-520 and accompanying text.
28 See generally, tribe, supra note 13.
" See, e.g., lribe. .supra note 13 (ultimate goal of restructuring is lower electricity prices);
Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy, Electric Industry is Changing
(visited Apr. 1, 1998) Chttp://www.inagnct.statesis/dpu/hrochute.hunkil > (stating that goal
of restructuring is to reduce costs to all consumers over time by means of competitive market
structure for electricity).
3° See, e.g., Act effective Sept. 24, 1996, ch. 854, § 1(a), 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3678, 3679
(West); Act of Nov. 25, 1997, ch. 164, § 1(b), (1), 1997 Mass. Legis. Serv. 637, 638 (West).
31 See, e.g., infra notes 33-134 and accompanying text.
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power and the co-evolution of environmental policy aims in the struc-
ture of electricity generation."
1. The Co-Evolution of Least-Cost Power and Environmental
Protection as Goals for the Structure of Electricity Generation
Although electric utilities are largely state regulated, the history
of the rise and decline of electricity regulation, and the parallel emer-
gence of public environmental objectives for the industry, can be
sketched by tracing the evolution of a handful of federal statutes that
strongly influenced that regulation: the 1920 Federal Water Power
Act," the 1935 Federal Power Act," 4
 the Public Utility Regulatory Poli-
cies Act of 1978 55
 and the Energy Policy Act of 1992.56
Federal electricity regulation emerged against the backdrop of
widespread state regulation of the industry." In the early years of
electric utility development—from the 1880s through the turn of the
century—towns and cities granted electric utility franchises that were
sometimes non-exclusive or even deliberately duplicative to create util-
ity competition. 38
 Disastrous competition in some cases led to company
32
 See, e.g., infra notes 77, 89, 123, 193, 160-61 and accompanying text; see also Mass. Enviro
Official Warns Midwest Regulators to Address Ozone Transport, Energy Report, Dec. 2, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 11831807 (hereinafter Mass. Enviro Official Warns Midwest Regulators) (quoting Mass.
DEP Commissioner Struhs' observation that EPA, FERC and the Chair of the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality all made solemn promises that deregulation will not interfere with achieve-
ment of minimum clean air standards for all Americans).
"Federal Water Power Act, eh. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C. (1994)).
31
 Federal Power Act, ch. 687, title II, 49 Stat. 838 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C.).
as Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified
in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
36 Encrg-y Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified in scattered sections
of 15, 16 and 42 U.S.C.); see also Union of Concerned Scientists, Risks and Opportunities:
Renewable Energy in a Changing Electricity Industry (visited Feb. 10, 1998) <hup://www.uc-
susa.orgiettergy/restructure.intro.hunl> (political factors including enactment of PURPA and
EPAct encouraged competition in electric sector).
A law intended to have primarily regional consequence, the Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act (1980), also played a role in explicitly merging least-cost power
and environmental objectives for electricity regulation. See Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 839). Like numerous other federal acts regulating power discussed supra, this Act articulated
strong environmental purposes, alongside its reliability, efficiency and cost-reduction goals. See
id. § 2. It specifically identified the development of renewable resources in the region, conserva-
tion of electricity and the protection of fish and wildlife resources. See id.
37 See infra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
58
 See pits E. KWOKA, JR., POWER STRUCTURE: OWNERSHIP, INTEGRATION, AND COMPETITION
IN THE U.S. ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 3-4 (1996).
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failures and consolidation." The consolidation of monopolies, free to
charge monopoly prices, in turn spurred widespread calls for public
takeover of the industry." The form of public ownership widely pro-
posed and widely implemented was municipalization."
In 1898, Samuel Insull, a dominant electricity industry leader,
proposed to the National Electric Light Association ("NELA") that
electric utilities should be regulated by state agencies that would fix
rates and set service standards." Insull saw such an approach as a
means to avoid calls for municipal takeovers of the industry on the one
hand, and as a method of reducing disadvantageous infra-industry
competition on the other.'" In 1907 NELA called for such regulation. 44
By the end of that year, Wisconsin and a few other states had estab-
lished utility regulatory agencies or added utility regulation to the
duties of other existing state commissions." By 1916 thirty-three states
had such agencies, and virtually all had them by the 1920s." Sig-
nificantly, state regulation was then seen as a means of keeping elec-
tricity prices down. 47 As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin explained,
the adoption of state regulation of electricity had as its goal the best
possible service "at the lowest price practicable?" The state's high
court observed that the granting of monopoly franchises in given
geographical areas was necessary to eliminate excessive investments
and expenses caused by two or more utilities co-existing where con-
sumers only required one." According to the court, the legislature
39 See generally Calumet Service Co. v. City of Chilton, 135 N.W. 131, 143 (Wisc. 1912)
(explaining one goal of Wisconsin's electricity regulatory statute as elimination of competing
utilities with their excessive invesunents and consequent waste, displacement of existing utilities
and increased electricity costs).
49 See generally Kwoxn, supra note 38, at 4 (municipally owned utilities portrayed private
systems as unconstrained monopolists and portrayed themselves as defenders of electricity at fair
prices).
41 See liyams, supra note 11, at 71.
42 See id. at 67, 71; see also Richard K Hirsh, Consensus, Confrontation and Control in the
American Electric Utility System, in THE VIRTUAL UTILITY: ACCOUNTING, TECI INOLOGY & COMPETI-
TIVE ASPECTS OF Tin: EMERGING INDUSTRY 19, 23 (Shitnon Awerbuch & Alistair Preston cds.,
1997) (noting Insull's advocacy of public regulatory bodies establishing allowable electricity rates
based on utility costs plus a reasonable profit).
43 See Hirsh, supra note 42, at 23.
44 See IIYMAN, supra note I1, at 71,
45 See, e.g., Wisconsin Traction, Light, Beat & Power Co. v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal
Co., 205 N.W. 551, 554 (Wisc. 1925) (discussing 1907 Wisconsin utility regulation statute's
enactment and scope); 1IYMAN, supra note 11, at 71.
46 See 1IYMAN, supra note 11, at 71; Kwoxn, supra note 38, at 4.
47 See, e.g., Calumet Service Co., 135 N,W. at 143.
48 See City of La Crosse v. La Crosse Gas & Eke. Co., 130 N.W. 530, 536 (Wise. 1911); see also
Calumet Service Co., 135 N.W. at 143.
49 See Calumet Service Co., 135 N.W. at 143.
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understood that allowing competing utilities to threaten existing in-
vestments and displace existing utilities would lead to waste, injustice
to previous investors and ultimately increases in electricity costs."
The result of this state regulatory trend in the first quarter of the
century was an electricity industry principally structured as a series of
regional monopolies, whose rates and investment decisions were regu-
lated by state public utility commissions. 5' The typical regulated mo-
nopoly was vertical integration in a single electric utility of all three
components of the business: 1) electricity generation facilities,
2) transmission lines and equipment and 3) distribution equipment. 52
This arrangement was often justified by high costs of market entry and
economies of scale that were thought to make electric utilities "natural
monopolies."58 The economies of scale achievable by these monopolies
could be reaped for society by blocking exploitative monopoly pricing
through government regulation." Theoretically, government regula-
tion would replicate market forces that ordinarily would keep price
near the lowest cost of production through the pressure of competi-
tion."
Because of jurisdictional limits to state regulation, however, states
had difficulty controlling the sprawling interstate electric utility hold-
ing companies that emerged in the 1920s and 30s." By 1932, sixteen
utility holding companies controlled an estimated seventy-five percent
of all electricity produced in the United States. 57 The concentration of
control permitted by this holding company structure led to excessive
rates for consumers and the obstruction of state utility regulation. 58 In
an attempt to regain control over the industry and reestablish reason-
able rates for electricity, federal regulatory legislation was enacted."
5° See id.
51 See, e.g., id. at 140; Kirsh, supra note 42, at 19.
"See, e.g., Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,543 (1996) [hereinafter Order No. 888).
55 See Re Pricing and Rate-making Treatment for New Electric Generating Facilities Which
are Not Qualifyng Facilities, D.P.U. 86-36-A, 89 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 190, 193 (Mass. D.P.U.
1987) [hereinafter D.P.U. 86-36-A). But see IIYMAN, supra note 11, at 72, 73 (regulation may not
simply have been inevitable result of a natural monopoly; utilities may have sought regulated
monopoly status to maintain profitability).
See generally D.P.U. 86-36-A, 89 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 193.
55 See id. at 195.
56 See DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, THE REGULATION or PUBLIC-UTILITY IIOLD1NG COMPANIES 2, 2 11.4 (1995).
57 See KWORA, supra note 38, at 5-6 (citing Asghar Zardhoohi, Competition in the Production
of Electricity, in ELECTRIC POWER: DEREGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 66 (Moorhouse, ed.
1986)).
59 See DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, SUpTa note 56, at 1.
59 See id. at 1, 1.
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One of the earliest federal statutes regulating electricity produc-
tion was the Federal Water Power Act ("FWPA"), enacted in 1920.°
The FWPA created the Federal Power Commission ("FPC"—later re-
named the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "FERC") and gave
it authority over hydroelectric projects in the navigable waters of the
United States.''' The FWPA authorized the FPC to issue a license to
citizens or American corporations wanting to create or operate hydro-
power facilities on navigable waters. 62 The FWPA also allowed the Com-
mission to regulate the power rates and services of the licensee where
the states did not do so, and prohibited unreasonable, discriminatory
and unjust rates or services for power sold interstate.''"
Congress passed the FWPA, in part, due to conservationists' efforts
on behalf of comprehensive development of the water resources of the
nation. 64 Conservationist W. J. McGee, the Secretary of the Inland
Waterways Commission appointed by President Theodore Roosevelt in
1908, called for comprehensive river planning which would take ac-
count of "the purification of the waters," the control of floods, com-
mercial river navigation and other benefits, as well as the development
of hydropower.° The FWPA, as eventually enacted, expressed this com-
prehensive interest in both development and conservation. 66 The stat-
ute allowed the FPC to give priority to hydropower applicants whose
plans were "best adapted to develop, conserve and utilize in the public
interest the . . . water resources of the region . . ." 67 Though the FWPA
was utilitarian in its focus, addressing navigation, water supply and
hydropower in various provisions, it did address resource conservation
in two provisions concerning the operation, maintenance or regulation
of fishways connected with dams or river diversions.° In its concern
about public losses due to private obstruction of navigation by hydro-
power dams, the FWPA implicitly recognized the need to regulate
where private parties might externalize costs onto the public.
6° See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
61 See Gifford Pinchot, The Long Struggle for Effective Federal Water Power Legislation, 14 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 9, 19, 20 (1945) (recounting history of statute's evolution),
w2 See Federal Water Power Act § 4(d).
63 See id. §§ 19, 20.
64 See First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power Conine'', 328 U.S. 152, 180 (1946);
see also Pinchot, supra note Si, at 15-19 (recounting conservationists' battles leading to Federal
Water Power Act).
65 See Pinchot, supra note 61, at 16 (quoting principles formulated by McGee in report of
the Inland Waterways Commission). President Theodore Roosevelt similarly supported compre-
hensive planning of the nation's waterways that would go beyond the single-purpose thinking of
prior river projects. See Id. at 15.
68 Federal Water Power Act § 7.
67 Id. (emphasis added).
till See, e.g., id. §§ 7, 10(a), 18, 25.
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Also important in the emergence of federal regulation of hydro-
power were the arguments of conservationists like Forest Service head
Gifford Pinchot against the give-away of hydropower sites on federal
lands.69 Pinchot proposed charging for such grants and limiting them
to a set number of years—proposals enacted in the FWPA. 7° Thus,
alongside concern over unreasonable electricity rates, concerns about
the environment and about the free private use of public resources
were implicit in one of the earliest federal statutes concerning power
production."
The Federal Water Power Act, however, proved insufficient to
control the excesses of the electric utility holding companies." Volu-
minous reports on the industry by the Federal Trade Commission and
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce revealed
ongoing abuses." As a result of these reports, Congress passed the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 ("PUFICA"), regulating
certain financial and securities practices of these electric companies,
in tandem with the Federal Power Act ("FPA")." The FPA subsumed
the earlier FWPA. 75 The FPA granted the FPC jurisdiction over all
interstate electricity transmission facilities of electricity, unless they
were expressly excepted by statute." The FPA also authorized the FPC
to create regional districts for the voluntary interconnection and coor-
dination of electric generation and transmission facilities for the pur-
pose of "assuring an abundant supply of electric energy ... with the
greatest possible economy and with regard to the proper utilization
and conservation of natural resources . . ." 77 Thus, early on, Congress
spoke of least-cost and environmental conservation goals for electricity
regulation in the same breath."
69 See Pinchot, supra note 61, at 12.
70 See Federal Water Power Act §§ 6, 10(c); Pinchot, supra note 61, at 12, 13, 19.
71 See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text. The free use of the nation's waterways to
generate electricity is not that dissimilar from the free use of the nation's air in the generation
of electricity. In both cases an essential component in the electricity generation process—a
riparian resource for hydropower input in the former case and an atmospheric resource for
combustion emission output in the latter—is being obtained grads from public resources.
72 See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
73 See Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, title I, 19 Stat. 803 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 79); DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, supra note 56, at vii.
71 Public Utility Holding Company Act § 1; Federal Power Act § 201.
75 See First Iowa Ilydro-Eledric Coop., 328 U.S. at 172 n.17 (recounting statutory evolution of
FPA and Federal Water Power Act).
76 See Federal Power Act § 213.
77 Id.
78 See id.
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With the price restraints established by a settled state/federal
regulatory structure, ever-increasing economics of scale in power pro-
duction and relatively stable costs for fuel and other inputs, the price
of electricity continued to fall in the initial decades of government
regulation and into the post-World War II period. 79 But the dramatic
upturn in the cost of oil after the 1973 oil embargo and the substantial
investment by the electric industry in costly nuclear plants and other
large, capital-intensive generating facilities in the 1960s and 70s began
a noticeable escalation of electric rates." The inflation-adjusted aver-
age residential electric rate rose twenty-five percent from 1970 to 1985;
the average adjusted industrial rate rose eighty-six percentP The larg-
est generating facilities were no longer experiencing economies of
scale." As FERC would later observe, "[b]igger was no longer better."85
Consequently, some industrial customers decided to opt out of the
utility system and build their own generation facilities."
By the late 1970s, the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources expressed concern over higher electric bills, consumption
of scarce fuels, the decline of domestic reserves of those fuels, increas-
ing reliance on imported fuels and the costly, "and perhaps unneces-
sary," expansion of electric generating capacity. 85 Against the backdrop
of the energy crisis of the 1970s and legislative concerns over energy
conservation, efficient resource use and equitable electric rates, Con-
gress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
("PURPA"). 86 Congress enacted PURPA, in part, to encourage the
79 See generally Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,543.
l'I'See id.; see also S. REP. No. 95-442, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S,C.C.A.N, 7903,
7905-06. Fuel oil rose 400% in cost from 1973-1978; natural gas costs rose 175% in the same
period. See S. REP. No. 95-442, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7906. In terms of
capital intensive facilities, the costs of nuclear plants particularly exceeded estimates, sometimes
by as much as 1000%. See Bernard S. Black, & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choke Between Markets
and Central Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 CoLuss. L. REV. 1339, 1346
(1993). Nuclear power ht particular, once promised as a source of electricity "too cheap to meter,"
had proven too expensive to afford. See, e.g., HYMAN, supra note 11, at 115; Hirsh, supra note
42, at 29.
81 See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,544. But see Congressional testimony by Commis-
sioner Susan F. Clark (of Florida Public Service Commission), Apr. 14, 1997, available in 1997
WL 11233109 (asserting U.S. as a whole has among the lowest electric rates in world; of indus-
trialized countries only Canada and Sweden, both with large hydropower resources, have lower
rates).
82 See S. REP. No. 95-442, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7906; Hirsh, supra
note 42, at 29.
88 Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,544.
84 See id.
85 See S. REP. No. 95-442, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7906.
"Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.); see
also S. REP. No. 95-442, at 10 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7906-07.
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development of alternative electricity sources that would reduce the
demand for fossil fuels, such as small hydroelectric projects, cogenera-
tion and other small power producers." By encouraging the formation
of numerous independent power producers, PURPA helped begin the
erosion of the existing structure of utility monopolies operating as sole
electricity generators for franchised service territories 8s After the en-
actment of PURPA, the twin, often interwoven, trajectories of deregu-
lation and environmental conservation began to emerge more dis-
tinctly.
PURPA announced as its purposes: 1) the conservation of energy;
2) the optimization of efficiency of use of facilities and resources by
electric utilities; and 3) equitable rates to electric consumers." To
accomplish these ends the statute established a number of federal
standards for electric utilities." Though not mandatory for the states,
the standards were to be formally considered and adopted or rejected
by each state regulatory commission. 91 The standards included: 1) thc
requirement that rates charged for electricity reflect the costs of pro-
viding electric service to each class of consumer; 2) a prohibition on
quantity discounts for the energy component of electricity unless costs
could be shown to decrease with such increased consumption; and
3) the requirement that each utility offer to its customers load man-
agement techniques determined to provide useful energy or capacity
management advantages and to be practicable, cost-effective and reli-
able.92 Over time the approach outlined in these standards would
evolve into "integrated resource planning" by the industry, where both
generating facilities and load management/conservation techniques
would be weighed in developing least-cost electricity services."
In addition to describing these .standards, .the statute also gave
FERC authority to require any electric utility to provide transmission
97 See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act § 210; Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Department of
Pub. Utils., 643 N.E.2d 1029, 1031 (Mass. 1994); see also& REP. No. 95-442, at 10 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7906-07.
88 See Mark E. Haedicke, Competitive-based Contracts for the New Power Business, 17 ENERGY
L.J. 103, 103, 104 (1996); Hirsh, supra note 42, at 30; tribe, supra note 13.
89 See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act § 101.
"See id, § 111.
91 See id. §§111(a)-(c), 117.
82 See id. § 111(d). Quantity discounts encourage greater electricity use and may encourage
waste, and can therefore have a negative impact on utility capacity manageinent, national eco-
nomic efficiency and the enviromnent.
93 See generally D.P.U. 89-239, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 72; see also 16 U.S.C.
§ 2621(d) (7) (1994) (adding integrated resource planning to federal standards). Environmental
externality programs would later take place in the context of integrated resource planning. See,
e.g., D.P.U. 89-239, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 74.
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services to any other electric utility, provided certain conditions were
met. 94 Conceptually at least, the statute raised the possibility of a na-
tional electric transmission system more open to utilities' commercial
power transmission, or "wheeling," from point to point: }5 PURPA and
associated federal regulations also defined non-utility generating facili-
ties that met certain size, ownership and fuel criteria as "qualifying
facilities" ("QFs"), and gave them the right to request connection to
utility transmission facilities." Environmental conservation and fuel
diversity objectives were manifest in the suggestion that QFs use renew-
able energy as their primary energy sources.`}? Under the statute, QFs
were also given the right to require utilities to purchase the electricity
they generate at a non-discriminatory price that did not exceed the
utility's incremental, or avoided, cost."
Although benefiting from an implicit state subsidy in the form of
guaranteed utility power purchases at a price not exceeding the rela-
tively high avoided cost rate, 99 QFs are entrepreneurial and stand at
least partially outside the regulated monopoly framework.'" Such in-
dependent power production soon became a significant source of the
nation's electricity, accounting for about half of the new generating
capacity created between 1990 and 1992. 19 ' In California, QFs rose
from only a negligible amount of electricity-generating capacity in the
early 1980s to representing twelve percent of dependable capacity by
1991. 192 The emergence of QE's, prompted by PURPA, thus began to
create a pool of independent power generators—another building
block for the foundation of a deregulated electric industry; and simul-
taneously pushed forward the development of renewable energy
sources with fewer environmental externalities. 105
" See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act § 205.
• 5 See id.
96 See id. §§ 201-202; see also flaedicke, supra note 88, at 104.
97 See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act § 201. The statute allowed FERC to establish rules
governing the qualifying criteria, but the statute referred to au eighty megawatt power production
facility capacity limit, the use of renewable resources, biomass, or waste as a primary energy
source, and ownership terms that generally excluded electric utilities. See id.
98 See id. § 210,16 U.S.C. § 824a•3(a)—(b). The incremental cost, also known as the avoided
cost, is the cost a utility would incur if the utility generated that increment of additional power
itself or purchased it elsewhere. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(d); Decision No. 91-06-022,124 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 184; see also 1.1aeclickc, supra note 88, at 104 & n.12.
11• See Decision No. 91-06-022,124 Pub. Util. Rep, 4th (PUR) at 186 (utilities are now legally
required to connect with QFs and buy their output under terms regulated by public utility
con mission) ,
it* See generally Haedicke, supra note 88, at 105.
1 ° 1 See II.R. REP. No. 102-474, pt. 1, at 138 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1954,1961.
1 °2 See Decision No, 91-06-022,124 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 186.
103 See supra note 96-97 and accompanying text, See generally H.R. REP. No. 102-474, pt. 1,
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Along with the statutory changes, technological innovations
helped lay the groundwork for the deregulation of the electric indus-
try." While very large facilities began to lose economies of scale, new,
more efficient, smaller-scale technologies emerged, including natural-
gas-fired combined-cycle generating plants." Bolstering the potential
of the new gas-fired technologies, a major upward revision in estimates
of domestic and world-wide natural gas reserves occurred at the close
of the 1970s and in the early 1980s. 106 The new gas-fired generation
stations had the advantage of shorter construction times and generally
lower impact on the environment. 107 Compared to coal, natural gas
produces negligible amounts of sulfur dioxide and roughly two-thirds
less CO2 when burned." Most significantly, the new gas-fired genera-
tion technologies could produce electricity at lower cost." From a fuel
at 138 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.CA.N. at 1961 (PURPA facilitated emergence of inde-
pendent power producers and introduced utilities to purchased power); Ilaedicke, supra note
88, at 104, 105.
151 See, e.g., infra note 105 and accompanying text.
1115 See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,544. Combined-cycle generation plants use a
combination of gas-fired turbines and steam turbines to generate electricity. See, e.g., W.M.
Burnett & S.D. Ban, Changing Prospects for Natural Gas in the United States, 244 SCIENCE 305, 307
(1989); M.R. Erbes et al., Off-design Performance of Power Plants: an Integrated Gasification Com-
bined-cycle Example, 237 SCIENCE 379, 381 (1987). The exhaust of the gas turbine is used to heat
steam to power a steam turbine to produce additional electricity. See Erbcs, supra, at 381. The
addition of the steam cycle puts energy to work that once escaped up the chimney, thereby
increasing electricity output per unit of fuel burned. See generally id. Combined-cycle plants can
be fired by natural gas, or they can be fired by coal which is first gasified and cleaned of pollutants,
in so-called Integrated coal gasification combined-cycle" ("IGCC") plants. See id.
L 06 See Burnett & Ban, supra note 105, at 305, 306.
107 See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,544. The greater efficiency of combined-cycle
technology over conventional coal generation, coupled with the cleaner-burning quality of natu-
ral gas, means that combined-cycle systems produce less than half the CO2 per kilowatt-hour
produced by conventional coal-fired stations. See Burnett & Ban, supra note 105, at 307. Natural
gas-fired combined-cycle plants also emit negligible quantities of volatile organic compounds or
particulates, and produce 40% less nitrogen oxides (NO,) than coal plants. See id. As clean as
gas-fired plants may be in some respects, they still generate large quantities of CO2—the main
culprit in global warming. See, e.g., Tint Woolf & Bruce Biewald, Efficiency, Renewables and Gas:
Restructuring as if Climate Mattered; ELECTRICITY J., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 64.
1 "See, e.g., Burnett & Ban, supra note 105, at 306; Woolf & Biewald, supra note 107, at 66.
09 See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,544; see also Peter Navarro, A Guidebook and Research
Agenda for Restructuring the Electricity Industry, 16 ENERGY LJ. 347, 352-53 (1995) (at current
natural gas prices medium-sized gas-fired plants often produce power cheaper than large coal-
fired or nuclear plants). Combined-cycle facilities can generate electricity as cheaply as 3-5
cents/kilowatt-hour (kWh), compared with 4-7 cents/kWh for large coal-fired stations and 9-15
cents/kWh for nuclear plants. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,544. It is important to note,
however, that the current relatively low price of natural gas is an important part of the present
low cost of gas-fired electricity generation. See, e.g.,MAssActnistrrs DIV. OF ENERGY RESOURCES,
TUE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF 'ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES ON NEW RESOURCE SELECTION AND
ELECTRIC RATES 8 (1991); Michael F. Donlan, Brief Whitepaper an Open Access and Deregulation
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with dismal and diminishing prospects in the 1970s, natural gas be-
came by the close of the 1980s "the fuel of the future.""°
Thus, by the late 1980s, relatively abundant gas reserves, com-
bined with independent power producers using cheaper, less-polluting,
gas-fired electricity generation, gave policy-makers a stronger techno-
logical foundation for simultaneously advancing the twin goals of least-
cost power and environmental protection." Some policy-makers be-
lieved, however, that existing state and federal regulatory schemes were
obstacles to full realization of the opportunities presented by these
technological and organizational changes in the industry." 2 Conse-
quently, certain state regulators suggested that electricity deregulation
might now be appropriate."' They argued that old justifications for
regulated monopolies—such as very high capital start-up costs for
generation companies—might no longer apply." 4
Members of Congress were becoming similarly concerned that
federal statutes, particularly PUHCA, were constraining the develop-
ment of independent power."' The House Committee on Energy and
of Retail Sales of Electricity and Gas, in RETAIL U•ritrry DEREGULATION 1, 3 (Massachusetts
Continuing Legal Education, Inc. 1996).
ImSee Burnett & Han, supra note 105, at 305; see also Hon. Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA: The
Intersection of Competition and Regulatory Policy, 16 ENERGY LJ. 419, 426 (1995) (in late 19705
natural gas was believed to be in permanent shortage and use in electricity generation was
drastically limited). Even with these favorable prognostications, the use of natural gas for elec-
tricky generation continued to decline into the early 1990s. See Statistical Comm. of the Edison
Elec. Inst., Statistical Yearbook of the Electric Utility Industry-1993 29 tbl. 22 (1994). In the
twenty-year period natural gas use in electricity generation declined from fueling 18.3% of the
electricity generated in the United States in 1973 to fueling only 9,0% of electricity produced in
1993. See id. Hy 1996, however, natural gas had become the energy source for about 13.5% of
electricity generated in the U.S. and was predicted to account for a little over 23% of generation
ill the year 2005. See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, ELECTRICITY INFORMATION 1996 671
(1997).
111 See supra notes 96-110 and accompanying text. Technological determinists could convinc-
ingly argue that the current deregulatory movement is the product of the collapse of one fuel,
nuclear, and the ascent of another, gas. See generally supra notes 80, 96-110 and accompanying
text.
I ts See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
113 See, e.g., 1).P.U. 86-36-A, 89 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 196 (utility regulation need not
be a permanent form of business control; where competition emerges in industries that formerly
had natural monopoly characteristics it may be appropriate or essential that regulatory constraints
be replaced by competitive market forces). The old argument that a single, integrated monopoly
generating, transmitting and distributing electricity in a given service area was seriously under-
mined once utilities began buying substantial amounts of electricity from independent power
producers (WI's). See generally Larry Parker, Congressiottal Research Service, Electricity: The Road
Toward Restructuring, (visited Oct. 14, 1997) Clittp://www.cnie,org/nle/eng-7.hurtl>. These
purchases demonstrated that contractual arrangements, rather than single•company operation
of both electricity production and distribution, could reliably meet customer demand. See id.
114 See generally supra note 113.
115 See H.R. REP. No. 102-474, pt. I, at 139 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1962.
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Commerce noted the success of independent power production that
resulted from PURPA."° Independent electricity generators could not
build projects in more than one state, however, without corning under
the exacting SEC regulation specified by PUFICA." 7 It was also unclear
whether, under existing federal law, FERC had authority to order
utilities to transmit, or "wheel," electricity for other companies.''' With-
out. such open access to the transmission lines, the formation of re-
gional and national markets for electricity would likely be inhibited.' 19
The federal Energy Policy Act of 1992 ("EPAct") was meant to elimi-
nate sonic of these barriers and open the monopoly-held transmission
grid to a variety of electricity generators.' 2°
Through EPAct, Congress sought to slow the rise of American
oil imports, conserve energy, encourage efficiency, provide new en-
ergy options and more diverse supplies, develop renewable energy
resources, increase competition in the electric industry and address
global warming.' 21 Moreover, the Act expressly linked least-cost goals
and environmental objectives in the nation's energy strategics. 122 The
statute announced, for example, that the goals of United States energy
research and development included "meeting future needs for energy
services at the lowest total cost to the Nation, including environmental
costs . . . . "123
In formulating EPAct, congressional committee members ob-
served the direct link between the level and type of energy consump-
tion and the quality of the environment.'" More efficient use of energy
could be used to reduce power plant emissions of CO2, the principal
"greenhouse gas" causing global warming, and also of pollutants such
un See id. at 133 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1956.
117 See id. at 139 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1962.
" 13 See id.
"9 See generally id.
12' See generally Energy Policy Act of 1992, § 721; 1.I.R. REP. No. 102-474, pt. 1, at 140 (1992),
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.CAN. at 1969.
' 20 See 1.I.R. REP. No. 102-474 pt. 1, at 133 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1955.
122 See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 2001(3).
' 23 Id. In its merger of environmental protection goals and lowest price goals in an implicit
"environmental least-cost" formula, EPAct echoed the formulation of the earlier 1980 Pacific
Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act. See Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act § 3. Cost-effective electric systems under that 1980 Act were
determined by least-cost reliable energy sources, and system costs were defined to include
"quantifiable environmental costs and benefits ... directly attributable" to a given electricity
resource. Id. Thus, in EPAct and in the earlier Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Act, least-cost objectives and environmental goals were clearly joined. See id.; supra
note 122 and accompanying text.
174 See I I.R. REP. No. 102-474, pt. 1, at 133 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1955.
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as sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides and particulates. 125 Thus, in develop-
ing EPAct, Congress expressly linked a competitive structure for elec-
tricity generation with the goal of reducing global warming and other
environmental impacts.' 26
EPAct authorized a new class of power producers, the "exempt
wholesale generator" ("EWG") . 127 An EWG is a generator exclusively in
the business of owning and/or operating a facility used for the genera-
tion of electricity to sell at wholesale. 128 EWGs arc exempted from the
utility registration and regulatory requirements of PUHCA.' 2° Unlike
the case of QFs under PURPA, utility holding companies are permitted
to own an interest in one or more EWGs under EPAct. 1 " EWGs also
do not have to meet the technical energy source criteria required for
QFs. 151 EPAct also amended the Federal Power Act to allow any elec-
tricity generator to apply to FERC for an order requiring a transmitting
utility to provide transmission services to the generator.'"
Thus, EPAct. considerably liberalized and widened the opportuni-
ties for independent power producers, freeing them from the regula-
tory burdens of PUFICA and potentially opening utility transmission
facilities to their electricity.'" While giving this impetus to the least-cost
power objectives of the deregulatory momentum growing in the states,
EPAct also expressly placed the reduction of global warming on the
national energy agenda, and implicitly advanced the goal of reducing
other environmental externalities.'" In states leading the deregulatory
movement, like California and Massachusetts, the twin objectives of
low-cost power and environmental protection would soon be reaffir-
med in state utility restructuring legislation.'"
126 See id. at 134, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1956.
126 See, e.g., Energy Policy Act of 1992 §§ 1602(a) (2), 2001(3).
127 See id. § 711; see also Uacdickc, supra note 88, at 106,
128 See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 711.
"9 See id.
15° See id.
131 See id.; see also Flacdicke, supra note 88, at 106. QFs arc limited in size and must use
renewable or alternative fuel sources or meet certain efficiency standards if they burn fossil fuels.
See, e.g,, Decision No. 9146-022,124 Pub. Util, Rep. 4th (PUR) at 188.
132 See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 72i.
135 See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text; see also tribe, supra note 13 (Congress
pushed the competitive evolution of the electric industry further with passage of EPAct). QFs arc
allowed to sell electricity at retail, however, while EWGs are limited to wholesale power sales. See
flaedicke, supra note 88, at 106.
134 See, e.g., Energy Policy Act of 1992 §§ 1602(a) (2), 2001(3). The Act called on the Secretary
of Energy to develop an energy strategy "designed to achieve to the maximum extent practicable
and at least-cost to the Nation ... the stabilization and eventual reduction in the generation of
greenhouse gases . . . ." Id. § 1602(a) (2).
1311 See infra notes 143,160-61 and accompanying text.
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2. State Deregulation of Electricity Generation and the
Reaffirmation of Environmental Protection and Least-Cost Power
as Twin Objectives
California and Massachusetts have played leading roles in the
push for deregulation, with both the California Public Utilities Com-
mission ("PUC") and the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities
("DPU") proposing restructuring programs in 1995. 136 Their state leg-
islatures enacted restructuring legislation in 1996 and 1997, respec-
tively.'" Very high electric rates in both states played a role in this early
drive to deregulate the industry.'" California's electric rates were fifty
percent above the national average, and were held to be one of the
causes of its job loss to foreign competitors and to neighboring cheap-
power states. 13" In 1996 California and Massachusetts ranked eighth
and ninth in the nation respectively in the cost of residential electric-
ity."" By 1997 California was spending $23 billion a year on electricity."'
The California legislature enacted its electricity restructuring stat-
ute, Assembly Bill 1890 ("A.B. 1890"), in the fall of 1996. 142 In A.B. 1890
the legislature explicitly linked the goals of low-cost power and envi-
ronmentally sensitive electricity production; "It is the intent of the
156 See Re Proposed Policies Governing Restructuring California's Electric Services Industry
and Reforming Regulation, Decision No. 95-05-045, 161 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 217 (Cal.
P.U.C. 1995) [hereinafter Decision 95-05-045]; Re Electricity Industry Restructuring, D.P.U.
95-30, 160 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 76 (Mass. D.P.U. 1995) [hereinafter D.P.U. 95-30]; see also
Donlan, supra note 109, at 1 (California and New England at front of deregulation movement);
Navarro, supra note 109, at 347 (California at forefront of deregulation). The California PUC
actually made its initial proposal for restructuring on April 20, 1994, in "A Vision for the Future
of California's Electric Services," also known as the "Blue Book" for the color of its cover. See ED
SMELOFF AND PETER ASVILIS 0 REINVENTING ELECTRIC UTILITIES—COMPETITION, CITIZEN ACTION,
AND CLEAN Pow ER 75 (1997). In 1995, in D.P.U. 95-30, the Massachusetts DPU outlined its vision
of electric utility restructuring, followed by a more detailed elaboration in D.P.U. 96-100 the next
year. See Re Electric Industry Restructuring, D.P.U. 96-100, 172 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 391
(Mass. D.P.U. 1996) [hereinafter D.P.U. 96-100]
1"7
	 Act effective Sept. 24, 1996, ch. 854, 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3678 (codified in scattered
sections of CAL. Conn (West 1998), commonly referred to as A.B. 1890); Act of Nov. 25. 1997,
ch. 164, 1997 Mass. Legis. Serv. 637 (codified in scattered sections of MAss. GEN. Laws (1997)).
131 See, e.g., Act of Nov. 25, 1997, ch. 164, § 1(d), 1997 Mass. Lcgis. Serv. at 638.
Ise Navarro, supra note 109, at 354; Marla Dickerson & Chris Kraul, What You Need to Ask
to Make an Informed Decision—Power to the People: California's Era of Electricity Deregulation Begins
Jan. 1, Bringing Consumers Many Choices, But Also More Than a Little Uncertainty, LA. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 1997, at DI (sidebar Expensive Electricity); sec also Decision 95-05-045, 161 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) at 245 (current regulatory scheme has failed to prevent California electric rates
front being much higher than rest of nation).
") See Dickerson & Kraul, supra note 139, at D1 (sidebar: Expensive Electricity).
141 See CAL. Pun. UTIL. CODE § 330(b).
142 See Act effective Sept. 24, 1996, ch. 854, 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3678.
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Legislature to ensure that California's transition to a more competitive
electricity market structure .. . creates a new market structure that
provides competitive, low cost and reliable electric service . . . and
preserves California's commitment to developing diverse, environmen-
tally sensitive electricity resources." The competitive framework cre-
ated by A.B. 1890 will give customers the right to choose their supplier
of electricity.'" Transmission functions arc to be separated from elec-
tricity generation functions, with the former left as a controlled mo-
nopoly and the latter rendered competitive and eventually unregu-
lated.'"
Under A.B. 1890 California will create two state-chartered, non-
profit market institutions: an "Independent System Operator" and a
"Power Exchange." 146 The Power Exchange will provide a competitive
auction similar to a commodities exchange, open on a non-discrimi-
natory basis to all electricity providers where customers can meet their
electricity dernands. 147 The Independent System Operator will have
centralized control over the statewide transmission grid, dispatching
electricity from the suppliers to meet this demand.' 48 The plan was
scheduled to begin January 1, 1998, but difficulties with the complex
computer programming required to coordinate the interconnected
real time trading of electricity and the management of the electric grid
caused a four month postponement of the system's start-up.'"
That least-cost power is not the sole goal for California's restruc-
turing is perhaps best indicated by All 1890's provision for accelerated
and full recovery of costs associated with previous uneconomic utility
investments and contractual obligations (so-called "stranded costs" or
"transition costs").' 5" The statutorily guaranteed recovery of stranded
costs will raise the price of electricity that consumers actually pay above
the power's going minimum market price.' 5 ' Stranded costs include
those associated with large capital investments in nuclear generating
stations and other expensive power plants.' 52 They also include long-
term power purchase agreements that were made under the previous
149 Id. § 1 (a).
144 See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330(d).
145 See id. § 330(k), (1).
145 SeeAd. effective Sept. 24, 1996, ch. 854, § 1(c), 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 3680.
147 See id.; Chris Kraul, Computer Woes Delay Electricity Deregulation, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1997,
at Al,
IQ! See generally Act effective Sept. 24, 1996, ch. 854, § 1(c), 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 3680.
145 See CAL. PUB. Um,. CODE § 330( u); Kraul, supra note 147, at AI.
150 See generally CAL. Pus. UTIL. CODE § 367; see also CAL. PUB, UTIL Comm §§ 840, 841. •
151 See generally id. § 330(s).
152 See, e.g., id. §§ 330(s), 368(d); see also id. § 840(1). The cost of nuclear power plants and
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regulatory system but that may not be recoverable at market prices in
a competitive system.' 53
 These costs are to be paid through a non-by-
passable transition charge levied on electricity consumers.'" The leg-
islature also intends, however, to give an immediate rate reduction of
no less than ten percent for residential and small commercial ratepay-
ers, financing the rate reduction through the issuance of "rate reduc-
tion bonds."'" Through the device of the rate reduction bonds, Cali-
fornia is attempting to reconcile the goal of low-cost power with full
repayment of utility investors for earlier costly misinvesttnents in nu-
clear power and other expensive energy sources.' 56
In late 1997, in language closely tracking many of the provisions
of the California statute, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted chapter
164 to restructure its electric utility industry. 157
 The Legislature's
finding that the state had one of the highest electricity rates in the
United States, and that these high rates were having an adverse effect
on Massachusetts business' ability to compete, prompted the enact-
ment of chapter 164. 1 " The Legislature's avowed goal was to create a
framework by March 1, 1998 under which competitive electricity gen-
erators would offer power and customers would gain the right to
choose their electric power supplier.'"
nuclear decommissioning may be the principal component of the problem of stranded costs. See,
e.g., Congressional testimony to Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources by William
D. Steinmeter (former president of the National Association of Regulatory Commissioners, and
prior chair of Missouri Public Service Commission), May 22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11233078
at *16-17, 22; Decision 95-05-045, 161 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (FUR) at 223.
15Y See Act effective Sept. 24, 1996, ch. 854, § 1(b), 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 3679; CAL. Pus.
UTIL. CODE § 330(s); see also CAL. PUB, UTIL. CODE § 840(f).
154 See CAL. Pus, UTIL. CODE § 330(v). Debate concerning stranded costs has centered on
whether under deregulation rate-payers will pay oil' these costs through a surcharge on their
electricity distribution bill, or whether the costs will indeed be left unpaid, in essence leaving the
loss with existing utility investors in the form of depressed stock values or diminished dividends.
See Steinmeier, supra note 152, at * 16; Charles Stein, For Investors, a Future of Uncertainty, Promise,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 17, 1998, at F3 (observing that allowing utilities to recoup their stranded
costs has been bad news for ratepayers who 'picked up the tab,' but good news for utility stock
investors).
155 See Act effective Sept. 24, 1996, ch. 854, § 1(b); see also The Utilities Reform Network,
Sparks Fly in the Electricity Market . . . Still More Deregulation (visited Jan. 18, 1998)
Chttp://www.turti.orgisparks.html > (expressing skepticism about rate-cut financed through sale
of bonds, similar to refinancing mechanisms with lower monthly payments but a larger total
payment over the long-run).
tr"'See generally supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
t57 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. This session law should not be confused with
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 164, which the Act of Nov. 25, 1997 amends.
15s See Act of Nov. 25, 1997, ch. 164, § 1 (d)-(e).
159 See id. § 1 (c); see also id. § 1(m).
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The statute stresses the importance of increased competition in
achieving long-term rate reductions.' 6° It also asserts, however, that
enhanced environmental protection goals arc essential to a more com-
petitive electricity market and calls for utilities to propose programs to
promote energy conservation and demand-side management as part
of their restructuring." Moreover, the statute requires the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts ("Commonwealth") to ensure that energy con-
servation policies, activities and services are appropriately funded and
available throughout the state.'" In its energy facilities siting provi-
sions, it calls on the Energy Facilities Siting Board to act "so as to
provide a reliable energy supply for the commonwealth with a mini-
mum impact on the environment at the lowest possible cost." 163 Thus,
as in California, the Massachusetts restructuring statute interweaves
least-cost and environmental protection objectives.' 64
As in the California plan, Massachusetts decided to separate the
function of electricity generation from transmission and distribution
services. 165 The successor distribution companies will have to ensure
direct retail access by consumers to all electricity generators.'"" The
separated generating companies will generally no longer be regulated
as public utilities.' 67 Distribution and transmission companies, however,
will continue to be substantially regulated.' 68 Distribution companies,
for example, will have exclusive service territories defined by the De-
partment of Telecommunication and Energy."'Y Thus, electricity distri-
bution will, for now, effectively remain a regulated monopoly. 17°
Further paralleling California, an important selling feature of the
Massachusetts deregulation scheme is that chapter 164 requires utility
160 See id. § 1(k).
Ilil See id. § 1 (1) .
162 See id. §1(j).
11tAct of Nov. 25, 1997, ch. 164, § 204, MASS. GEN, LAws ch. 164, § 691-1.
1 " See supra notes 143, 160-63 and accompanying text.
165 See Act of Nov. 25, 1997, ch. 164, § 1(m) 1997 Mass. Legis. Scrv. at 638; see also MAss.
GEN. LAws ch. 164, § 1A(b)-(c).
1 " See Mass. GEN. LAws cli, 164, § 1A(a).
187 See id.
159 See, e.g., id. §§ 1B, 6911.
1119 See id. § 16.
170 See id. The Act does, however, require a study of exclusive distribution service territories
to determine if such exclusivity should be terminated or altered. See Act of Nov. 25, 1997, ch.
164, § 312, 1997 Mass. Lcgis. Serv. at 713. Instead of a single electricity rate, consumers will be
charged separate ("unbundled") rates for generation, for distribution, for transmission and for
other services. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 164, § ID. Any stranded cost charges allowed by the
Commonwealth will also be listed separately on the bill, as so-called "transition charges." See
For consumers who decide not to purchase electricity from an independent generating company,
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restructuring plans to reduce consumer electric rates by ten percent
from the average undiscounted rates applicable in August of 1997.' 7 '
Chapter 164 similarly provides for recovery of stranded costs, called
"transition costs" in the statute. 17' Because it may be difficult to cover
all costs of generating, transmitting and distributing electricity, pay off
old misinvestments that contributed to high electricity rates in the first
place and give consumers a ten percent rate cut, the statute authorizes
rate reduction bonds to refinance some of these costs.'"
In sum, electricity deregulation as expressed in California's and
Massachusetts' restructuring legislation does not depart from, but
rather reaffirms, the twin policy objectives of least-cost power and
environmental protection articulated in the evolution of federal regu-
latory statutes. 174 As Peggy Welsh, Executive Director of the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, has observed, values
other than economic efficiency will continue to be important for the
restructured electricity industry, including protecting the environ-
ment. 175 In restructuring the industry, least-cost power is not the sole
or even paramount goal.' 76
 Thus, even under deregulation, the ques-
tion is not whether to incorporate environmental protections and a
reduction of externalities in restructuring the electric industry, but
rather, how best to do so.' 77
the distribution company will act as the default electricity provider. See id. § 15(d). The distribu-
tion company also serves as the default provider of electricity for consumers who buy electricity
front an independent generator, if and when the independent generator does not deliver. See id.
§ 18(h), (d).
171 See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 164, § 113(b). By Sept. 1, 1999 the rate reduction is required to
reach 15%. See id.
172 See, e.g., id. §§ 1A(a), 1G. Transition costs may include unrecovercd costs for generation
plants, recovery for nuclear entitlements and certain post-shutdown and decommissioning costs
for nuclear plants that are not recoverable from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's decom-
missioning fund. See id. § 10(b). In addition, transition costs may include purchased power
agreements contracted earlier at rates that are now above market. See
' 73 See generally id. §§ I, I G(c) (2) (companies demonstrating that 10% rate reduction is not
financially viable, without use of rate reduction bonds to refinance debt associated with transition
costs, may be allowed to use such bonds).
I4 See supra notes 143, 160-63 and accompanying text. California had already linked least-
cost power and environmental protection objectives in earlier amendments to its public utility
regulatory law, declaring that in addition to other ratepayer protection objectives, a principal
goal of electric ... resource planning and investment shall be to minimize the cost to society of
the reliable energy services that are provided by . electricity, and to improve the environment
. . .“ CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701.1(a) .
175 See Lori M. Rodgers & Joseph F. Schuler Jr., Ready, Fire, Aim—California and the Nation
on the Eve of Competition, PUBLIC UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, Jan. 1, 1998, at 28-29.
' 76 See Act of Nov. 25, 1997, ch. 164, preamble, § 1 (b), (1), 1997 Mass. Legis. Serv. at 638; Act
effective Sept. 24, 1996, ch. 854, § 1(a), 1996 Cal. Lcgis. Serv. at 3679.
177 See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
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B. Advancing the Goal of Environmental Protection Through the
Regulation of Environmental Externalities—The Case of Carbon Dioxide
Emissions
Electricity generation is the source of a variety of environmental
externalities."' These externalities may be relatively localized impacts,
such as water consumption, the production of liquid and solid waste,
land use impacts, fuel delivery impacts, noise, related transmission line
impacts and aesthetic impacts."' Other effects of the industry are
global in impact or reach irretrievably into the distant future. The
radioactive waste from nuclear power plants, for example, will have to
be safely isolated from the environment for at least 10,000 to 100,000
years.' 8° Electric generating stations arc also a significant source of air
pollution, including sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, particulates and
CO2—the principal greenhouse gas.' 8 ' Because of the widely diffused
and long-term consequences of global warming, electricity genera-
tion's CO2/global warming externality is used here as a representative
case of the general problem of environmental externalities for the
industry.' 82
178 See, e.g., D.P.U. 89-239, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR), at 94; Mary Nagelhout, Valuation
of Environmental Externalities in Electric Resource Selection, PUBLIC UTILS. Foam:Gil-fix, Mar. 1,
1993, at 45.
I" See, e.g., D.P.U. 89-239, 116 Pub. Util, Rep. 4th (PUR) at 94; D.P.U. 86-36-G, at 78;
Nagelhout, supra note 178, at 45.
181) See 10 GER. 960.4-2-1 (1997); see also Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1995: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 104th Cong. 14-15 (1995) (statement of Sen.
Paul Wellstone) (estimated life-cycle costs of repository keep climbing and have reached $33.1
billion with only $19 billion in utility funding currently projected; shortfall could be left with
public along with title to radioactive waste for 10,000 years and potentially infinite liability).
181 See, e.g., Congressional testimony of Lewis M. Milford (senior attorney for Conservation
Law Foundation), Sept. 9, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10830888 (electric power industry is the
largest single industrial source of air pollution, contributing to ozone, acidification and nitrifica-
tion of lakes, rivers, estuaries and forests, premature death from small particle inhalation and
mercury contamination); Woolf & Biewald, supra note 107, at 66 (electricity sector responsible
for about one-third of U.S. CO2 emissions).
182 See infra notes 183-92 and accompanying text. The environmental impacts of CO2 are
largely occurring as externalities because carbon dioxide is not yet subject to extensive federal
and state regulation. See josKow , supra note 8, at 10,
Although not as significant an externality as nuclear waste when measured by the dimension
of time, the greenhouse gases carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide (I n120), once emitted, do remain
in the atmosphere for decades to centuries. See Intergoverrunental Panel on Climate Change,
Summary for Policymakers: The Science of Climate Change-1PCC Working Group 1, § 1 (visited Feb.
10, 1998) <http://www.ipcc.ch/cc95/wgl.hun >. Thus, even immediate human action to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions radically will not restore preexisting atmospheric conditions for some
dine. See generally id., § 5 (thermal inertia of oceans would mean global warming would continue
even after greenhouse gas concentrations were stabilized).
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In the 1960s, climatologists like Syukuro Manabe of Princeton and
oceanographer Roger Revelle began to speculate that increasing at-
mospheric CO2 could cause global warming.'" By the time the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change issued its 1995 report on
global warming, the international scientific consensus had concluded
that the balance of evidence suggested a discernible human influence
on global climate was occurring,'" with the consequent possibility that
the earth's mean surface temperature would rise 1-3.5°C. by the year
2100.' 85 Such a temperature increase might cause drought in some
parts of the world, increased flooding in other areas, increased pest
and disease outbreaks and other adverse effects on ecological systems
and human society.'" The increased melting of polar icc or thermal
expansion of the oceans caused by the warming could raise ocean
levels by nearly a meter, leading to greater coastal erosion, storm
damage and potentially devastating losses of low-lying lands. 187 Many
shoreline regions and small island nations are thus particularly con-
cerned over the possible impacts of global warming due to greenhouse
gases.' 88
CO2 is considered the most significant of the greenhouse gases
and most of the human-originated CO2 results from fossil fuel combus-
tion.'" The United States bears particular responsibility for the prob-
lem, as it produces over twenty percent of the world's energy-related
CO2 emissions.'" Electricity generation is the sector of the American
185 See, e.g., Gore, supra note 5, at 4-5; Kitta MacPherson, Princeton Prophet—'Greenhouse
godfather' predicted effect, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, June 11, 1990.
I" See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 182, § 4; see also WORKING
GROUP II TO THE SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: IMPACTS, ADAPTATIONS AND MITIGATIoN OF CLIMATE CHANCE:
SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL. ANALYSES 78 (Robert T. Watson et al., eds., 1996) (energy-related green-
house gases create a danger of anthropogenic interference with Earth's radiative balance).
189 See WORKING GROUP II TO THE SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 184, at 22.
ls 6 See id.
187 See id. at 22, 24, 31, 269. The Working Group 11 estimated that a one meter ocean level
rise could result in a 6% loss of land area for the Netherlands, a 17.5% loss for Bangladesh and
up to an 80% loss for the Majuro Atoll in the Marshall Islands, given current coastal protection
systems. See id. at 36.
188 See, e.g., Ross GELBSPAN, THE I !EAT Is ON: THE HIGH STAKES BATTLE OVER EARTH'S
THREATENED CLIMATE 109 (1997) (Alliance of Small Island States, worried about territory losses
from coastal flooding, is strongest advocate of tough greenhouse gas emissions limits).
189 See, e.g., WORKING GROUP II TO THE SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERCOVERN-
MENIAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 184, at 12, 78, 84. About three quarters of
human-caused CO2 emissions are caused by fossil fuel combustion. See 1 International Energy
Agency, Climate Change Policy Initiatives-1994 Update 14 (1994) [hereinafter International Energy
Agency, Climate Change Policy]. '
IN See International Energy Agency, Climate Change Policy, supra note 189, at 24-26 tbls.4-6.
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economy most responsible for these massive CO2 emissions, causing
approximately thirty-seven percent of the U.S. outpul.' 91 Thus, the
global significance of CO2 externalities from the U.S. electricity indus-
try is pronounced.' 92 Physical reduction of this externality could be
achieved by: 1) reducing electricity consumption through conserva-
tion and efficiency; 2) increasing the electricity generated by non-com-
bustion energy sources such as wind or solar power; 3) switching from
coal and oil to natural gas, which emits less CO2; or 4) absorbing CO2
in carbon "sinks," such as forest preserves.'"
C. Regulatory Options for Remedying Externalities Like Carbon Dioxide
Emissions
The overall thrust of electricity deregulation suggests that market
pricing of electricity will steer, on its own, investment into the above
four physical remedies for excessive CO2 emission and thus adequately
deal with the externality.'" In their details, however, California and
Massachusetts' electricity restructuring statutes have not left such en-
vironmental objectives to the workings of raw market price alone.'"
Instead, the statutes intervene in the electricity market with various
191 See id. at 178.
192 See supra notes 1119-91 and accompanying text.
I" See generally WORKING GROUP II TO TIM SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, ROM note 184, at 589. Sonic consultants estimate that
every forested acre pulls two tons of carbon from the atmosphere and stores it (in the form of
wood) each year. See, e.g., Elizabeth Striano, Carbon Sequestration: Robin Hoods of the Forest?,
PUBLIC UTILS. Foturmoirriv, Aug. 1997, at 24. A single average coal generation station, however,
emits 4.3 million tons of CO2 each year. See id.
American electric utilities have begun buying forest land or environmental easements to
maintain forests to serve as carbon sinks (carbon sequestration). See id. at 25. For example, in
the Rio Bravo Carbon Sequestration Project, Wisconsin Electric Power Co,, Cinergy Corp., Detroit
Edison Co, and PacifiCorp., working with the Nature Conservancy, UtiliTree Carbon Co. and the
Programme for Belize, purchased 14,400 acres in Rio Bravo, Belize, to preserve it as forest. See
id. Utilities are interested in preserving forests in the developing world, because the projects there
are more cost-effective. See id. at 24. Even the Edison Electric Institute, which helped form the
UtiliTree Carbon Co. as a sequestration project of 40 electric companies, admits that there are
political problems involved with American companies going into another country, buying up its
land and putting that land off limits for the next 100 years. See id. at 25; see also Michael D.
Lemonick, Turning Down the Heat, TIME, Dec. 22, 1997, at 23, 24 (noting many developing
countries rejected greenhouse gas emissions trading).
Engineers are also looking for technological means to separate CO2 from the exhaust gases
of power plants, for piping to exhausted natural gas fields for subterranean injection and
permanent geologic storage. See generally WORKING GROUP II TO THE SECOND ASSESSMENT RE-
PORT OF -rim INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra, at 589.
194 See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 161, § 6911 (suggesting policy of Commonwealth is to
allow market forces to determine the need for and cost of electricity generation facilities).
195 See, e.g., infra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
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mechanisms which will have the effect of reducing CO2 emissions and
other externalities.'"
Some of these interventions are market-based, in that they make
heavily polluting generation more expensive or make less-polluting
generation cheaper, but still allow consumers to choose the dirtier
source of electricity if they wish.' 97 Subsidies for conservation and
renewable energy enacted by the restructuring statutes are such mar-
ket-based interventions.'" Statutory requirements to label electricity
products by their power sources (e.g., percent nuclear, percent wind-
generated) or air emissions are likewise market-based interventions
because they give consumers information needed to make intelligent
cost comparisons but still allow consumers to decide between various
electricity products.'"
Some intervention mechanisms take a non-market form—for ex-
ample, requiring an electricity vendor to use a certain percentage of
power generated by renewable energy sources, or to meet certain
emission performance standards. 2" Such mechanisms do not allow the
consumer to choose to pay more to pollute."' Instead, the state uses
traditional "command-and-control" regulation to require or prohibit
certain conduct by the electric utility. 202 Various market-based and
non-market-based regulatory interventions arc discussed below.
1. Market-Based Regulatory Mechanisms to Control Environmental
Externalities Like Carbon Dioxide Emissions
a. Environmental Adder Programs
Shortly before the emergence of the electricity deregulation move-
ment, the Massachusetts DPU, the California PUC and other state pub-
lic utility commissions experimented with an explicit attempt to price
externalities as "environmental adders." 203 This method, also known as
1 " See, e.g., infra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
197 See generally infra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
198 See infra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
199 See generally Mass. GEN. Laws ch. 164, § 1F(6) (requiring labeling of electricity products,
but not barring particular products).
296 See, e.g., Mass. GEN. LAWS ch. 25A, § 11F.
2° ' See infra note 202.
202 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. Laws ch. Ill, § 142N (requiring the Department of Environmental
Protection to promulgate uniform emissions standards for fossil fuel-fired generating facilities).
203 See infra notes 210-42 and accompanying text. The monetary values for the externalities
were added (hence ''adders") to other conventional costs for the resource to allow cost-compari-
son between options, with non-price criteria such as reliability or fuel diversity then applied to
further weight various options, See, e.g., D.P.U. 89-239, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 94.
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"monetization, " set a dollar value—the adder—for each externality. 2"
The adder—for example, $22/ton of CO2 emitted—was used in cost
comparisons between different power generation and conservation
methods to select the least-cost generation option. 205 Because the envi-
ronmental adders programs were a well-developed attempt to address
externalities in market form, they bear examination as an initial bench-
mark useful in assessing other intervention mechanisms.
Regulators argued that such adders would create a more accurate
estimate of the full social costs of any given utility investment option. 206
Theoretically, by giving a more realistic cost comparison of electricity
alternatives, adders would ensure inclusion of environmentally prefer-
able independent power sources, demand-side management ("DSM")
and conservation and load management ("C&LM") measures in the
meeting of electricity dernand.2"7 State officials anticipated that the use
of the adders would lead to less-polluting forms of electricity genera-
tion. 2U6 Massachusetts and California briefly used this monetization
approach. 209
In 1989 DPU proposed various options for the inclusion of envi-
ronmental externalities in facility and resource evaluation. 21° The next
year the DPU issued final regulations requiring electric companies to
use certain monetized values to account for the environmental exter-
nalities caused by the electricity resources they were considering:4 i' The
DPU reasoned that in choosing between two equally priced, equally
reliable facilities that both met federal pollution control standards, but
that nevertheless caused markedly different levels of pollution, society
2°1 See, e.g., D.P.U. 89-239, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 87, 89.
205 See id. at 89, 98; MassAcilusrris DIV. OF ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 109, at 1-2, 4.
2°!3
	
e.g., Decision No. 91-06-022, 124 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (FUR) at 187; MAssActiusin -rs
Div. OF ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 109, at 4.
297 See generally D.P.U. 89-239, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (FUR) at 71 (part of integrated utility
planning is to ensure inclusion of all appropriate resources including QFs, independent power
producers ("IPPs"), conservation and load management ("C&LM") measures and other demand-
side management ("DSM") options). Contrasted with supply-side management (increasing elec-
tricity supply), DSM includes electricity conservation, shifting electricity demand to off-peak hours
and improving the energy efficiency of appliances and buildings. See Decision No, 91-06-022,
124 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (FUR) at 187. The term C&LM is often used more or less interchangeably
with the term DSM. See, e.g., MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 220, § 10.02 (1995); see also James W. Moeller,
Electric Demand-Side Management Under Federal Law, 13 VA, Etorri.. L.J. 57, 57 (1993).
208 See, e.g., ,,..."ASSACHUSETF8 DIV. OF ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 109, at 5.
2" See infra notes 210-42 and accompanying text.
21 ° See D.P.U. 86-36-G, at 82-96; see also Massachusetts Elec. Co., 643 N.E.2d at 1031 (in D.P.U.
89-239 the Department determined that in selecting new resources, electric company must
consider environmental externalities); D.P.U. 89-239, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 71.
211 See D.P.U. 89-239, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) al 71, 89.
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would pick the less polluting facility. 212 Therefore, the DPU reasoned
that the additional pollution from the non-selected facility must have
an economic value to society. 2 ' 3
The DPU's externalities regulations set out initial values for cer-
tain air emission externalities connected with combustion-based gen-
erating stations. 2 " The DPU tried to account for a wide variety of
environmental impacts in establishing environmental externality val-
ues, including human death, genetic effects, materials damage, losses
in agricultural productivity and also impacts on non-priced "goods"
such as losses of scenic value and damages to non-human species and
natural systems.215 Environmental externalities were used in cost-effec-
tiveness tests for preapprovals of C&LM and generation programs, QF
requests for proposals, power purchase agreements and resource plan-
ning filings with the DPU. 216
Because estimates of comprehensive damage costs caused by en-
vironmental externalities arc difficult to make, the DPU decided to use
the "cost-of-control" (also known as "implied valuation") method for
approximating those damages and valuing the environmental ad-
ders. 217 Under this method the cost of pollution control equipment to
reduce a given air emission by a ton is assumed to approximate the
value to society to eliminate that ton of pollution.m The DPU assumed
that society would be willing to pay that amount to avoid a ton of
emissions in order to further avoid an equivalent or greater amount
of environmental damage. 216 In other words, if society was, for example,
already mandating the expenditure of $6,500 per ton to reduce somcof
the nitrogen oxide emissions of generating stations, under the cost-of-
control approach the environmental adder was set at $6,500 per ton
212 See id. at 90.
212 See id.
214 See id. at 98. Externality values established by the DPU included: nitrogen oxides at
$6,500/tort emitted, sulfur oxides at S1,500/ton, volatile organic compounds at $5,300/ton, total
suspended particulates at $4,000/ton, carbon monoxide at $870/ton, CO2 at $22/ton, methane
at S220/ton and nitrous oxide at $3,960/ton. See id.
215 See Massachusetts Elec. Co., 643 N.E.2d at 1032. The DPU decided, however, to assess
externalities from a "global perspective" and not consider site-specific environmental externali-
ties, such as noise, visual and wetland impacts of specific facilities in the 1RM process. See D.P.U.
89-239, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 94, 95, 96. It also decided not to consider externalities
connected with the production of the fuel used by the generator, in terms of mining impacts for
coal. See id. at 95. Instead it focused on all impacts resulting from plant operation including air,
water, solid waste, spent fuel disposal impacts and resource use. See id.
216 See D.P.U. 89-239, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 97.
217 See id. at 90, 93,
218 See id. at 91.
2111 See id.
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for any remaining nitrogen oxides still being emitted by the plant. 221 ,
Although the DPU adopted this cost-of-control/implied valuation
methods for adders, it announced as its ultimate objective the use of
comprehensive damage costs as the basis for environmental externality
adders where feasible. 22 '
In late 1994, however, in Massachusetts Electric Co. v. Department of
Public Utilities, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court disallowed
central aspects of the DPU's environmental externality requiremen ts .222
The court held that the DPU exceeded its authority when it required
consideration of environmental externality values that might not rea-
sonably be expected to affect a utility's costs and hence the rates that
electric customers pay.223 The court held that the effects of pollution
on persons other than the ratepayers and the over-all impact of pollu-
tion on society were important subjects, but were beyond the reach of
DPU regulatory authority. 224 According to the court, these wide-rang-
ing environmental effects were the domain of the legislature and
environmental and other regulators to whom the legislature has dele-
gated authority. 225
Following the Supreme Judicial Court's decision, the DPU
stopped imposing monetized externality values on utilities. 226 The
DPU, however, continued to mandate that reasonably foreseeable en-
vironmental control requirements with cost implications for ratepayers
be considered by utilities when weighing resource procurement alter-
natives. 227
Unlike Massachusetts, the California Legislature required by stat-
ute that the state's PUC include a value for any costs to the environ-
225 See id.
221 See D.P.U. 89-239,116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 93.
222 See Massachusetts Elec. Co., 643 N.E,2d at 1033,1034.
223 See id. at 11)33.
U4 See id. at 1034.
225 See a The court rejected the view that the DPU lacked statutory authority to direct utilities
to consider the relative environmental impact of alternative sources of electricity when deciding
among alternative power sources. See id. at 1031. The court observed that reasonable costs
incurred in protecting the environment, whether mandated or voluntary, could be reflected in
a utility's approved rates. See id. at 1033. The court further held that if it reasonably appears that
the emission of a pollutant will be affected in the foreseeable future by prohibitions, new
restrictions, costly regulation or pollution penalties or taxes, the DPU could require the utility to
pursue a course likely to be less costly to rate-payers in the long-run, See id. at 1034. The court
accepted the DPU's conclusion that the acceptability of a potential electric power option should
be determined, in part, by the possible costs to the utility of that source's likely pollution. See id.
226 See Re Boston Edison Co„	 95-1-CC, at *7 (Mass. D.P.U. 1995), available in 1995
WL 109422.
227 See id.
1022	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 (Vol. 39;993
ment when calculating the cost effectiveness of energy resources, in-
cluding C&LM options.'" The legislature added this provision in 1990,
declaring the principal goals of electric utility resource planning and
investment to be minimizing the cost to society of reliable energy
services and improving the environment. 229 The legislature also an-
nounced as part of this goal the encouragement of a diversity of energy
sources through improvements in energy efficiency and the develop-
ment of renewable energy resources, such as wind, solar and geother-
mal energy. 23°
In 1991 the California PUC began incorporating consideration of
non-price factors, such as environmental impacts, in determining ap-
propriate levels of QF development."' The PUCis announced goal was
to arrive at "environmental least-cost" resource planning. 2"2
 The com-
mission noted that, although environmental quality had long played a
significant role in discussions of electric resource strategics, the com-
mission had not previously established a quantitative basis for weighing
such non-price factors to determine the value of particular resource
options. 2" The commission also noted that the value of DSM is better
appreciated when non-price factors are taken into consideration."'
Because of the severe air pollution problems in parts of California,
the PUC first targeted air emissions in implementing its externality
program.2" The PUC suggested, however, that it would eventually in-
clude water and land use impacts in assessing externalities. 2"f Like
Massachusetts, California decided to calculate the value of these exter-
nalities by means of the "revealed preferences" method (i.e., implied
valuation), using the costs of existing pollution control per ton of
pollutant eliminated to approximate the externality's cost. 2"7
In 1992, however, the PUC decided to retreat from a sweeping
application of externalities. 2 "s It decided not to apply externality values
228 See CAL. PU11. UT1L. CODE § 701.1(c) .
229 See id. § 701.1(a).
2343 See id. The legislature later added biomass as a renewable energy resource to be devel-
oped. See id.
231 See Decision No. 91-06-022, 124 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 181.
232
 See id.
233 See id. at 187.
"4 See id.
233 See id, at 189, 190.
238 See Decision No. 91-06-022, 124 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 189.
237 See id. In its 1991 decision implementing its externality adder program, the PUC proposed
deriving the dollar/ton monetary value for various pollutants from various sources: the pollution
control requirements of the air management district of the utility's service area, from a Pace
University Study of pollution costs and from the California Energy Commission's 1990 Electricity
Report, depending on the pollutant involved and other factors. See id. at 195, 196.
238 See Decision 92-04-045, 132 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 222, 223; see also Richard D.
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to "short term" power purchases—power supply agreements of less
than five years—aiding the cost-competitiveness of existing coal-fired
plants. 2'9 Moreover, in a june 1995 decision involving QF bids governed
by PURPA, FERC ruled against central aspects of the California PUC's
use of environmental adders, in terms similar to the Supreme Judicial
Court's ruling against the Massachusetts externality program. 24° FERC
did not object, however, to states using numerous other ways outside
of PURPA to encourage electrical generation using renewable energy,
such as directly ordering utilities to build renewable generation, deny-
ing certification to other types of facilities, encouraging renewables
through the tax structure or giving direct subsidies to renewable en-
ergy generators."' FERC suggested, for example, that imposing a tax
on fossil fuel generation or giving tax incentives to renewable energy
sources might be one way to allow alternative generation to be cost
competitive with fossil-fueled power without violating PURPA. 242
Notably, neither the Supreme Judicial Court nor FERC denied the
existence of environmental externalities in their rulings."' Neither
body definitively denied that attempting to account for externalities
was socially beneficial."' The Supreme judicial Court instead reasoned
that the DPU was not the appropriate body to make the decision about
such externalities.245 For its part, FERC suggested alternative means of
accomplishing environmental goals in electricity generation that did
not violate PURPA. 24''
Gary & Michael L. Teague, The Inclusion of Externalities in Electric Generation Resource Planning:
Coal in the Crossfire, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 839, 858, 859 (1993).
239 See Decision 92-04-045, 132 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 223.
2411 See Southern Cal. Edison Co., 71 F.E.R.C. 4 61,269, at 62,080 (lune 2, 1995). FERC said
that the California PUC could account for environmental costs of fuel sources in the bidding
process for power providers, but only for costs that would actually be incurred by the utility. See
id. The FERC held that a state "may not set avoided cost rates or otherwise adjust the bids of
potential suppliers by imposing environmental adders or subtractors that arc not based on real
costs that would be incurred by utilities." Id. FERC noted that PURPA set the utility's incremental
or avoided cost as the maximum rate at which a utility could be required to purchase power from
a QF. See id. at 62,079-80. FERC reasoned that to use methods like environmental adders would
result in rates exceeding the incremental costs to the utility in violation of PURPA. See id. at
62,080.
241 See id.
242 See id.
243 See Massachusetts Elec, Co„ 643 N.E.2d at 1034; Southern Cal. Edison Co., 71 F.E.R.C. at
62,080.
244 See supra note 243.
243 See Massachusetts Elec. Co., 643 N.E.2d at 1034.
246 See Southern Cal, Edison Co., 71 F.E.R.C. at 62,080.
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b. Emissions Taxes, Subsidies for Conservation and Renewable Energy
Although use of environmental adders may be waning, other mar-
ket-based mechanisms for controlling or addressing environmental
externalities are being implemented or widely discussed. 247 One such
market-based mechanism is the emissions tax."' Emission taxes as-
sessed per unit of pollutant could be used to internalize environmental
externalities."9 In effect, this approach adds a price to the emission. 25°
Polluters will theoretically reduce their pollution when the cost per
unit of pollution control is lower than the tax per unit of pollution. 25 '
By paying for the additional pollution control equipment in the price
of electricity, consumers will pay a price reflecting the environmental
impact of that power's production."' Consequently, they may reduce
their purchases of high-emissions electricity products, thereby reduc-
ing the environmental impact of their power consumption. 2" Without
resorting to government mandated emissions limits, the market
mechanism of price, as modified by the emissions tax, would encour-
age consumers to select electricity options with fewer emissions. 254
Another market-based means of reducing externalities is to subsi-
dize energy efficiency and the production of electricity by renewable
energy. 255 By subsidizing renewably generated electricity, thereby mak-
ing it cheaper, more consumers will select environmentally preferable
electricity products. 256 The externalities connected with coal or nuclear
generation will be correspondingly reduced. 257
247 See, e.g., infra notes 248-53 and accompanying text.
248 See, e.g., Black & Pierce, supra note 80, at 1393 (emission fees being discussed widely as
feasible means of limiting greenhouse gas emissions).
245 See, e.g., Josxow, supra note 8, at 3; PLATER ET AL., supra note 4, at 31,
2" See generally josxow, , supra note 8, at 7.
251 See id.
252 See generally id.
2" See generally id. Cf. generally D.P.U. 86-36-C, at 79 (failure to internalize externalities
through price or other means increases likelihood of suboptimal choice).
2-54 See generally Josxow, supra note 8, at 7; Black & Pierce, supra note 80, at 1392 (power
producers will reduce emissions if doing so costs less than the emissions tax).
255 See, e.g., CAL. Pun. UT1L. CODE § 381.
256 See generally Jon Steinman, Green Power May Be Too Pricey for the People—Deregulation:
Environmentalists Worry That the Cost of Eco-friendly Electricity Will Discourage Consumers From the
Choice Come January, L.A. lIMES, Nov. 18, 1997, at B1 (one poll indicated 30% of California's
consumers would pay premium for environmentally safe energy; most people will choose power
provider based on price).
257 See, e.g., Stephen Bernow et al., Quantifying the Impacts of a National, Tradable Renewables
Portfolio Standard, ELECTRICITY J., May, 1997, at 42-43; see also Woolf & Biewald, supra note 107,
at 64-65 (renewable energy technologies could reduce CO2 emissions from electricity, whereas
coal and even gas may increase those emissions).
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California's and Massachusetts' restructuring statutes provide for
the subsidization of conservation and electricity generated with renew-
able energy.'" Without explicitly calling for electricity price mecha-
nisms to account for environmental externalities, the statutes' subsidy
provisions would, like adders, increase the relative cost of electricity
options with high environmental impacts and decrease the cost of
environmentally preferable electricity. 259 California's A.B. 1890, for ex-
ample, creates a special mandatory ("non-bypassable") rate compo-
nent to fund certain environmental programs, to be collected by the
distribution service on the basis of electricity usage. 2 ° This charge will
be used to fund cost-effective energy efficiency and conservation ac-
tivities and in-state operation and development of existing, new and
emerging renewable energy technologies. 261
Massachusetts similarly promotes energy efficiency and renewable
energy sources in its electricity restructuring plan. 262 The Massachusetts
restructuring statute creates, for example, a five-year mandatory
charge per kilowatt-hour (kWh) for most electricity consumers to fund
energy efficiency and DSM programs. 263 Chapter 164 of the Massachu-
setts General Laws also requires the Commonwealth's Department of
Revenue to investigate a possible income tax deduction for purchases
of specified minimum levels of renewably generated electricity and for
purchases of energy efficient equipment such as high-efficiency light.-
ing.'61 The statute directs the Secretary of Administration and Finance
to study the possibility of requiring all state agencies and facilities to
purchase electricity that includes a minimum of ten percent derived
from renewable energy sources. 265
258 See infra notes 260-68 and accompanying text.
259 See generally infra notes 260-68 and accompanying text.
260 See CAL. PUB. UHL. CODE § 381.
261 See id. Energy efficiency and conservation activities arc to be funded at over $228 million
per year for the first three years of restructuring. See id. Renewable resource technologies are to
be funded at $109.5 million or more per year during this period. See id. The legislature stipulated
that these programs should include options that reward the most cost-effective generation. See
id. § 383. The statute effectively defines renewable energy resources as those whose electricity is
not produced by nuclear energy, hydropower facilities greater than 30 megawatts, tion-cogeneva-
Lion fossil-fuel burning facilities or facilities that derive more than 25% of their energy from fossil
fuel. See id., § 381(b) (3); see also § 2805 (defining "conventional" power sources). The legislature
particularly cited the need to support certain emerging photovoltaic and innovative solar thermal
technologies and renewable energy facilities. See id. §§ 381(c) (3),(h), 383(a) (1),(3).
262 See infra notes 263-68 and accompanying text.
263 See MASS, GEN. LAWS ch. 25, § 19. This charge is to be 3.3 mils ($0.0033) per kWh the
first year and decrease every year down to 2.5 mils per kWh. See id. Municipal lighting company
electricity consumers are exempted from the charge. See id.
264 See Act of Nov. 25, 1997, ch. 164, § 318, 1997 Mass. Legis. Sent, at 714-15.
265 See id. § 330. Section 331 of the Act also requires state agencies doing new construction
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Similar to California, Massachusetts' deregulatory legislation re-
quires a five-year mandatory per kWh charge for most of the Common-
wealth's electricity consumers to support the development of renew-
able energy projects. 266 The revenues from renewable energy charges
are to be paid into the Massachusetts Renewable Energy Trust Fund
established by chapter 164. 267
 The purpose of the fund is to promote
the increased availability, use and affordability of renewable energy in
a more competitive energy marketplace. 268
c. Labeling Electricity Products
Massachusetts' electricity product labeling requirement is another
market-based regulatory mechanism that may be useful in controlling
the environmental externalities of electricity generation. 288 One neces-
sary condition for efficiently functioning markets is full information
about the products/services being selected by the consumer. 270 Often,
however, the market itself fails to provide full information, particularly
concerning deleterious aspects or side-effects of products. 271 Manda-
or substantial renovations to design and build so as to reduce facility life cycle costs by using
energy efficiency or renewable energy technologies. See id. § 331.
266 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 25, § 20. The renewable energy project charge is set at 0.75
mils/kWh the first year, goes up to 1.25 mils/kWh by the third year and then decreases to 0.5
mils/kWh by the fifth year. See id.
267 See id., § 68; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40J, § 4E.
2613 See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 25 §§ 20, 68; MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 40J, § 4E. For purposes of
expenditures from the fund, renewable energy technologies include solar and wind energies,
ocean thermal, wave, or tidal energy; fuel cells; landfill gas; naturally flowing water and hydro-
electric and low emission; and advanced biomass power conversion technologies such as gasifica-
tion of agricultural and food wastes, See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 40J, § 4E(f) (1). Circumscribed
Funding is also available for waste-to-energy projects for a limited dote, See id,
Beyond the promotion of renewable energy, the fund may also be used to advance public
interests in the protection of the environment through the prevention, mitigation and alleviation
of adverse pollution effects associated with certain types of electricity generation. See id. § 4E(c).
To advance these purposes and the purpose of promoting renewable energy, the fund may be
used to make grants, loans, equity investments, energy production credits, bill credits or rebates
to customers. See id § 4E(d). The Division of Energy Resources is required to issue an annual
report containing information on the extent to which the energy markets are achieving the
energy efficiency and fuel diversity goals of the state. See Mass, GEN. LAws ch. 25A, § 11E,
269 See infra notes 270-83 and accompanying text.
2" CI Re Pricing and Rate-making Treatment for New Electric Generating Facilities Which
Are Not Qualifying Facilities, B.P.U. 86-36-F, 98 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 76, 82-83 (Mass. D.P.U.
1988) [hereinafter D.P.U. 86-36-F] (information barriers helped caused market failure concern-
ing some electricity options).
271 See, e.g., 11.11. REP. No. 449 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2350, 2352 (legislative
history of federal cigarette labeling act noting public relies on government for cautionary labeling
of hazardous substances, thus Congress should take affirmative action to require cautionary
health warning on cigarette packages); H.R. REP. No. 1861 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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tory uniform labeling requirements may, therefore, be necessary to
make market choices optimize the allocation of consumer dollars. 272 In
a competitive electricity market, labeling electricity products with en-
vironmental impact and fuel-source information could theoretically
enable consumers to select environmentally preferable electricity op-
tions, thereby reducing environmental externalities.'"
Massachusetts' chapter 164 requires such labeling for electricity
products."' For example, before service is initiated by a generation
company, the company must give the customer a written statement on
the fuel mix and emissions of the generation sources the company
uses."' The company is also allowed to advertise the environmental
benefits of the power sold, although there is no requirement to do
2SO. 76
Moreover, the Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications
and Energy is directed to promulgate uniform labeling regulations for
energy suppliers. 277 The labeling must include fuel sources as well as
air emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxides, CO2, heavy metals
and any other emission which the Department may determine causes
significant health or environmental impact and for which sufficiently
accurate and reliable data is available. 2" Electrical suppliers are re-
quired to present such information to customers, including informa-
tion about environmental characteristics of the sale of electric power
products. 279
In addition, chapter 164 requires the Massachusetts Commis-
sioner of Energy Resources to provide consumers with information
giving a consistent and reliable basis for comparing electricity services
offered in the market. 2" That information may include billing inserts
providing information that allows consumers to select their electricity
2833,2834 (legislative history of Federal Hazardous Substances Act noting need for mandatory
labeling of hazardous materials; many have been injured or killed by substances not bearing
adequate cautionary labels).
272 See generally .stipra notes 270-71 and infra notes 274-83 and accompanying text.
275
	 generally infra notes 274-83 and accompanying text.
274 See infra notes 275-83 and accompanying text.
275 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 164, § 1F(5)(i) (1997).
276 See id. § 1F(5)(ii-iii).
277 See id. § 1F(6).
"8 See id. Voluntary environmental labeling programs for electricity, such as the "Greene"
program in California run by the Center for Resource Solutions, have also appeared in the
restructured electricity market, See Natural Resources Defense Council, Choosing Clean Power in
California (visited Feb. 10, 1998) Chttpi//www.nrdc.org/tirdc/howto/eitcagp.html,
278 See MASS. GF.N. Laws ch. 164, § 1 F(6).
250 See MASS, GEN. Laws ch. 25A, § 11D.
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suppliers based on resource type and environmental considerations.281
The Commissioner also may disseminate information identifying the
mix of fuel and power generation sources and the level of air emissions
for the different electricity services offered in the market. 282
 Thus, one
of the premises of restructuring seems to be that optimal environ-
mental protection in electricity generation will be determined through
a market governed by informed consumers selecting the level of emis-
sions and the types of fuels they believe are best. 285
2. Non-Market Regulatory Mechanisms for Controlling Externalities
Like Carbon Dioxide
a. Emission Performance Standards
State restructuring schemes are also incorporating other regula-
tory mechanisms that more closely resemble conventional command-
and-control environmental regulation. 284 Under chapter 164 in Massa-
chusetts, for example, to prevent and mitigate the impacts of pollutants
from fossil fuel-fired generation facilities, the Department of Environ-
mental Protection ("DEP") is required to promulgate uniform genera-
tion performance standards for emissions produced per unit of elec-
trical output for any pollutant DEP determines to be a public health
concern.285 DEP is only required, however, to have such a performance
standard in place for one pollutant by May 1, 2003. 286
Chapter 164 also amends statutory provisions concerning the
state's Energy Facilities Siting Board ("the Board"). 287 The Board is
required to review the need for, and the environmental impacts of,
transmission lines. 288 But the Board is no longer authorized to review
the need for electrical generating facilities, and may only review their
environmental impacts consistent with the policy of allowing market
forces to determine the need for and cost of such facilities. 289 To
281 See id.
282 See id.
283 See generally supra notes 274-82 and accompanying text.
284 See infra notes 285-95 and accompanying text.
285 See Mass. GEN. LAws ch. 111,  § I42N.
288 See id. If other northeastern states enact similar standards before May of 2003, DEP may
adopt such standards, See id.
2" Compare MASS. GEN. Laws ch. 164, § 6911 (1997) with Mass. GIN. LAws ch. 164, § 6911
(1996).
288 See Mass. GEN. LAWS ch. 164, § 6911 (1997).
289 See id. Compare Mass. GEN. Laws ch. 164, §§ 691, 69J (1996) (previously requiring con-
struction of electricity facilities to he consistent with filed long-range electricity demand forecasts)
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"streamline" review of such applications, chapter 164 provides that the
Board shall conduct rulemaking to establish a "technology perform-
ance standard" for generating facilities emissions, including sulfur
dioxide, nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, fine particulates, carbon
monoxide, volatile organic compounds and heavy metals. 2" Notably,
carbon dioxide emissions are not on this initial statutory list. 291 The
standard is to reflect emission rates achievable by fossil fuel generating
technologies, as demonstrated by air permits that have previously been
issued by the DEP. 292
Reflecting concerns similar to those expressed in DPU's prior
externality adder program, chapter 164 also authorizes the Energy
Facilities Siting Board to establish its own guidelines requiring suf-
ficient data to enable it to review the local and regional land use
impact, local and regional cumulative health impact, water resource
impact, wetlands impact, air quality impact, solid waste impact, radia-
tion impact, visual impact and noise impact of the proposed facility. 2"
But any such guidelines are generally not allowed to require any data
related to the necessity or cost of the facility. 291 Furthermore, chapter
164 does not require the Board to make findings regarding alternative
generating technologies for the proposal, as long as the proposed
facility meets the technology performance standard—i.e., matches the
performance of previous air emission permits issued by DEP. 295
b. Mandatory Generation Portfolio Characteristics
Another strategy for reducing CO2 emissions and other electricity
externalities is to require that a certain percentage of electricity offered
for sale in the restructured market be generated using renewable
energy. 299 In its simplest form, such an approach would amount to a
non-market, command-and-control mechanism for addressing such
with MAss. C. LAws ch. 164, § 69J1/4 (1997) (now barring requirement of data related to
necessity or overall cost of facility). Generating facilities may not be built unless approved by the
Board. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 164, § 69J1/4 (1997).
29a MASS. GEN, LAws ch. 164, § 69J1/4 (1997).
29I See id, The list, however, is not exclusive. See id.
292 See id.
2"s
	 id.
294 See id. Despite the fact that the statute generally does not require an analysis of cost or
need, the statute provides that the generating facility "shall be deemed to contribute to a
necessary energy supply for the commonwealth with a minimum impact on the environment at
the lowest possible cost" upon satisfactory completion of board review. Id.
295 See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 164, § 69J1/4.
296 See, e.g„ MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 25A, § 11F; Bernow et al., supra note 257, at 42.
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environmental externalities. 297
 Market mechanisms, in the form of cre-
dits for renewable generation tradable between electric companies,
however, could be used to reduce the cost of such a mandate 298
 Pro-
posals for this type of "renewables portfolio standard" are being dis-
cussed or implemented at both the state and federal levels. 2"
The Massachusetts restructuring statute, for example, scheduled
an increasing mandatory percentage of electricity to be generated
from renewable energy. 30° Under chapter 164, the Massachusetts Divi-
sion of Energy Resources is required to determine the current percent-
age of kWh sales to end-use customers in the Commonwealth that
is derived from renewable energy. 30 ' Every retail electricity supplier
must then provide an additional one-half to one percent of sales of
electricity derived from renewables to end-use customers each year
after 2003. 302
ANALYSIS
A. Reaffirming the Twin Policy Objectives of Least-Cost and
Evironmental Protection in the Restructuring of the Electricity Industry
Since 1920 a growing theme in federal power regulation has been
that electricity must be organized in a way that also serves the nation's
environmental interests. 303 PURPA and EPAct made this theme explicit
297 See generally 13ernow et al., supra note 257, at 43,
291 See, e.g., id. at 42, 43. Generators using renewable energy in such a credit system would
have two sources of income—one from the sale of their electricity, and another from the sale of
renewable energy credits to generators or retail electricity suppliers in legions short on renewable
generation. See id. at 43. A credit system is not just a market tool for achieving least-cost power.
See id. at 44. It is also a means of overcoming the fact that some regions may be able to produce
more renewably generated electricity than others, due to an abundance of wind, available solar
energy, tidal power, etc. See id.
299 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. Laws ch. 25A, § 11F; see also Bernow ct al., supra note 257; at 42.
"'See infra notes 301-02 and accompanying text.
3°1 See MASS. GEN. Laws ch. 25A, § I IF.
302 See id. § 11F(a). The statute creates the following schedule for increases in electricity
derived from renewable energy: an additional one percent of sales by the end of 2003, an
additional one-half percent of sales each year front 2009 through 2009, and an additional one
percent of sales from 2010 on until determined otherwise by the Division of Energy Resources.
See id. Chapter 164 considers solar, wind, ocean thermal, wave or tidal energy, fuel cells utilizing
renewable fuels, landfill gas and low-emission biomass power conversion as renewable energy
generating sources for these purposes. See id. § 11F(b). Vifaste.taeriergy electricity generation
from municipal solid waste and hydroelectric power may be counted as renewable generating
sources in the base calculation until December 31, 1998. See id. The Division of Energy Resources
is allowed to add other renewable energy technologies to the list, but coal, oil, natural gas except
when used in fuel cells, and nuclear power are statutorily excluded from classification as renew-
able energy supplies for this calculation. See id.
.4" See, e.g„ supra notes 60-78 and accompanying text.
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and planted it. firmly alongside the goal of least-cost power in federal
and state approaChes to electricity regulation. 3" Even in the heat of
deregulatory restructuring, both . California and Massachusetts have
legislatively asserted that environmental protection goals are central to
any reorganization of the electric industry. 305 Thus, appraisal of evolv-
ing electricity restructuring proposals should include an analysis of
how well they will address environmental externalities." In any analysis
of the restructuring of the industry the question should not simply be:
"How can we obtain the cheapest power?" The question should instead
be: "How can we obtain low-cost, reliable power in ways that advance
our national environmental goals?""
Some enthusiasts for market and price as sole determiners of
social investment might claim that deregulation of electricity and reli-
ance on price will alone take care of environmental externalities." But
the record of price in adequately assigning costs in the electricity
industry is not reassuring." If price alone will not achieve our national
environmental objectives, policymakers will need to enact regulatory
mechanisms to intervene in the market. 3 m
The following analysis looks at some of the historic environmental
failures of price in the electricity industry. 311 It examines why price may
have difficulty addressing environmental problems like CO2 emissions,
thus leaving them as externalities. 312 It explores the advantages and
shortcomings of some of the mechanisms developed by the states
to intervene in the electricity market to answer environmental con-
cerns. 3 's Finally, it suggests some of the additional steps that could be
"4 See supra notes 89-103, 121-34 and accompanying text.
t°5 See, e.g., Act effective Sept. 24, 1996, ch. 854, §1 (a), 1996 Cal. Legis, Serv. 3678, 3679
(West); Act of Nov. 25, 1997, ch. 164, § 1(1), 1997 Mass. Legis. Serv. 637, 638 (West).
306 See generally Act effective Sept. 24, 1996, ch. 854, §1(a), 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 3679; Act
of Nov. 25, 1997, ch. 164, § 1(1), 1997 Mass. Legis. Serv. at 638.
3°7 See generally supra note 304 and accompanying text.
308 See, e.g., tribe, supra note 13 (competition can be expected to provide lowest possible
price and improve environmental performance); Bruce Biewald, Competition and Clean Air: The
Operating Economics of Electricity Generation, ELEcTiuctry J., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 41, 42 (quoting
utility official's argument that competition will produce environmental benefits because older
coal and oil plants will not be economically viable in competitive market); What is deregulation?,
BOSTON Guist, Man 17, 1998, at Fl, F8 (sonic think competition will do snore to improve
environment than regulation ever did). But see Biewald, supra, at 44, 45 (one study concludes
that existing dirtier plants will be competitive economically; competition alone cannot be counted
on to improve environment); Woolf & Biewald, supra note 107, at 68 (older coal plants likely to
be very competitive relative to new gas facilities and thus unlikely to be retired).
3°9 See, e.g., infra notes 315-26 and accompanying text.
310 See, e.g., supra notes 60-71, infra note 319 and accompanying text.
3 " See infra notes 315-26 and accompanying text.
312 See infra notes 327-417 and accompanying text.
913 See infra notes 418-79 and accompanying text.
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taken to better achieve the public goal of environmental protection
within a restructured electricity industry. 314
B. The Limitations of Price in Addressing Long-Term, Global
Environmental Problems Like Climate Change
1. Historic Failures of Price to Protect the Environment and
Prevent Environmental Externalities
Price has repeatedly failed to signal full costs in the generation
and use of electricity.313 The cost of damming a river in 1920, in
concrete and steel, labor and capital, for example, did not adequately
capture the costs to society of impaired navigation or fisheries. 316
 The
federal government was forced to intervene, through the FWPA and
other regulation of hydropower dam construction, to protect naviga-
tion, fisheries and other public interests that the market had failed to
safeguard adequately . 317 Similarly, the market costs of erecting a coal-
fired generating station in 1969 did not adequately reflect the social
costs that the station imposed by degrading air quality. 318 The govern-
ment was forced to mandate air pollution control through the 1970
Clean Air Act Amendments in order to protect air quality interests not
previously recognized in conventional price-based decision-making. 319
If the market, by itself, had been sufficient to allocate all the environ-
mental costs of electricity production to electricity companies without
intervention, statutes like the 1970 Clean Air Act should not have been
necessary.m Instead, the market repeatedly has had to be corrected by
3 " See infra notes 480-518 and accompanying text.
515 See infra notes 315-26 and accompanying text.
316 See generally supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
"See generally supra notes 60-78 and accompanying text. Sadly, even upon regulation the
government itself often undervalued public environmental resources. See, e.g., Pinchot, supra
note 61, at 11.
515 See infra note 319.
111 See generally II.R. REP. No. 91-1146 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356, 5360,
5356, 5357 (observing that air pollution continues to threaten health and well-being of American
people and that strategies previously pursued against air pollution have been inadequate; estab-
lishment of national air quality standards by Clean Air Act Amendments will assure war against
air pollution will take place nationwide). Prior to the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act,
emissions standards for stationary sources of air pollution, like electricity generating plants, were
established exclusively state by state. See id at 5358. Members of Congress believed that national
air emission standards would preclude states competing to attract plants by means of inadequate
state air pollution regulations. See id. The amendments did not address CO2 emissions, see id. at
5357 &n.1, a problem then just beginning to be suspected by only a small section of the scientific
community. See generally supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
320 See generally supra note 319.
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state and federal regulation to prevent the imposition on the public of
the environmental costs of electricity."'
As the Massachusetts DPU itself warned when it first announced
its original environmental externalities ruling:
In a competitive resource market in which price plays a pre-
dominant role in determining the business success of com-
peting resource developers, there is a danger of increasing
the pollution of valuable environmental resources. This oc-
curs because resource developers have the incentive to mini-
mize environmental controls in order to minimize produc-
tion costs, which in turn enables them to keep their price as
low as possible (thus increasing their chances of winning a
competitive resource solicitation), and affords them the op-
portunity to make private profits. By minimizing environ-
mental controls, environmental costs external to the produc-
tion and sale of energy increase . . . . Failure of the resource
selection process to consider the differences in environ-
mental impacts between various resource types—either by
failing to internalize such environmental externalities directly
with the price of energy produced by such options or by some
nonprice mechanism that assigns a value on externalities
produced or avoided—increases the likelihood of selecting
suboptimal energy projects. 522
Thus, in some respects the market is not only inadequate to guide
consumers' allocation of resources in a way that advances the public
goal of environmental protection and least overall cost, it may, in
some instances, guide investment and consumption in directions
that damage the environment and increase long-term cost. 323
The market repeatedly ignored negative externalities imposed by
the electric industry on the public.'" The market also failed to direct
consumer arid utility investment to environmentally preferable electric-
ity options like energy conservation and renewable energy. 323 This
321 See, e.g., supra note 319.
322 D.P.U. 86-38-G, available in 9 Massachusetts Administrative Law Library, Department of
Public Utilities File (Jan. 1998), at 79 (Mass. D.P.U. 1989).
323 See id.; see also Congressional testimony to Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources by Julie A. Keil (president of the National Hydropower Association), May 8, 1997,
available in 1997 Wt. 10571005 (in competitive electric sector deci sions made arc based exclu-
sively on economic, cost-driven theories that do not recognize natural resource or environmental
values).
529 See, e.g., supra notes 206-08, 319.
325 See infra notes 340-43 and accompanying text; see also Edward Rubin et al., Realistic
Mitigation Options far Global Warming, 257 SCIENCE 148, 262, 264 (1992) (existing cost-effective
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failure was evident, for example, in the lack of investment in cost-ef-
fective energy efficient lighting and appliances until regulators inter-
vened."'
One of the principal environmental concerns regarding deregu-
lation is that conservation and renewable energy may have difficulty
making progress in a competitive electricity market."' It is widely ex-
pected that renewable power from solar, wind, geothermal and other
sources will cost more than conventional power—perhaps ten to twenty
percent more. 528 If California is any indication, though some niche
marketers may sell their power based on its renewable energy content,
most electricity will be marketed and purchased on the basis of low
price rather than environmental considerations. 329
The numerous provisions in restructuring statutes that constrain,
adjust and modify the competitive generation market, suggest policy-
makers are aware that price, on its own, will not adequately control
environmental externalities and steer power purchases to environmen-
tally preferable resources like conservation and renewable energy.'"
For example, if legislatures were confident an electricity system gov-
erned solely by competitive pricing would steer sufficient investment
to the generation of electricity with renewable energy, there would be
no need to subsidize or require the use of renewable energy sources."'
But both California and Massachusetts legislatures mandated support
for renewable energy in their electricity restructuring statutes.'" Simi-
larly, the decade spent by numerous public utility commissions at-
tempting to develop environmental externality adder mechanisms to
technologies could reduce electricity use by 45%, eliminate 515 million metric tons of CO2
emissions per year and save American consumers S30 billion annually; information barriers,
institutional problems and other obstacles make it unlikely these measures will be fully imple-
mented in absence of effective policy tools and incentives).
328 See infra text accompanying notes 340-43.
327 See, e.g., Keil, supra note 323. But see Greg Johnson, Color of Power—`Green' Energy Firms'
Tactics Mark Change in a Sleepy Industry, L.A. Timm, Nov. 20, 1997 at D4 (surveys suggest that
70% of Americans might embrace green power if prices are not too far out of line; early reports
suggest green power marketing tests drawing 20% of customers).
328 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, supra note 278; Steinman, supra note 256,
at Bl; see also Adam Perunan, Principle, Not Price, Sells Green Power, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 17,
1998, at F8 (most•analysts predict alternative nonpolluting electricity will cost more).
329
 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 327, at D4 (battle over California's electricity market will be
waged mostly on price); see also Pertman, supra note 328, at F8 (most consumers will be driven
primarily by lower prices in choosing power suppliers; studies show 5-33% of Massachusetts
consumers will choose "green" electricity).
3" See generally supra notes 258-95 and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 258-61,266-68,300-02 and accompanying text.
332 See supra note 331.
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compensate for unregulated CO2 emissions and other unaddressed
costs of electricity generation also suggests regulatory awareness of the
shortcomings in price. 663 Even some of the harshest critics of adders
admitted that certain environmental costs were not adequately incor-
porated in the price of electricity."'
2. Why Price. May Fail to Address Long-Term, Global
Environmental Problems Like Climate Change
The repeated failure of price to serve successfully both principal
public objectives for the electricity industry—least-cost power and en-
vironmental protection—suggests that price is inadequate for achiev-
ing certain public purposes."' There are a number of credible expla-
nations for this possible limitation. 336 The limitations of price may
spring from some combination of: 1) information costs to consumers,
discouraging change from the status quo; 2) the relatively short time
frame used by individual consumers to assess costs and benefits com-
pared to the much longer time frames appropriate for societal deci-
sionmaking; 3) the difficulty of pricing geographically diffused costs,
particularly those which will be borne by millions of widely dispersed
individuals; 4) the difficulty of assessing costs for harms whose full
magnitude is uncertain; and 5) the non-recognition by the market of
important social values—like neighborliness, altruism, belief in inter-
national equity, reverence for the diversity of life, religious tenets and
hope for our children's children. 947 Each of these factors which may
impair the adequacy of price in allocating resources is discussed below,
with particular emphasis on its relation to CO2 emissions.
a. The Problem of Information Costs
The market may have difficulty reliably steering consumers to
least-cost and environmentally preferable electricity options in part
3" See supra notes 205-37 and accompanying text.
"4 See, e.g., Josicow, , supra note 8, at 3,11.
335 See, e.g., infra notes 340-43 and accompanying text; see also John a Cushman Jr., U.S.
Says Its Greenhouse Gas Emissions Are at Highest Rate in Years, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1997, at A22
(quoting observation of director of American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, in face
of increased U.S. CO2 emissions in 1996 despite commitment to reduce greenhouse gases, that
"fllaissez-faire does not work").
334/ See infra notes 338-417 and accompanying text.
"7 See, e.g., GELBSPAN, supra note 188, at 131 (quoting Philippine environmental official's
observation that climate change problem necessitates transcending greed; ultimately is question
of ethics).
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because of the problem of information costs. 338
 The time it takes a
consumer to uncover information on cost-saving alternatives and to
calculate if those cost-savings apply to the consumer's existing equip-
ment and/or patterns of usage represents an additional cost to the
consumer for any change from the status quo. 339
A revealing example of a failure of market mechanisms in the
electric industry caused by information barriers was the failure of
consumers to buy energy-efficient lighting, refrigerators and other
appliances in the 1980s, even where those appliances were cost-effec-
tive."° As the California PUC admitted, programs that transform the
market for energy-efficient products, for example by increasing build-
ing or appliance standards, arc unlikely to be naturally provided by a
competitive market."' The Massachusetts DPU similarly noted the dys-
function of the market in consumer failures to invest in cost-effective
electricity-saving technologies. 312
 Consumers frequently did not invest
in electricity-conserving lighting, appliances and other technologies,
even where those technologies were cost-effective when compared to
the alternative of purchasing more electricity for conventional lighting
and appliances. 343
In explaining this market failure, the Massachusetts DPU agreed
with commenters that consumer lack of information, particularly con-
cerning recently developed technologies, was a cause of the lack of
investment in cost-effective technologies."' Thus, information barriers
prevented market price from directing investment to the least-cost
335 See generally Coase, supra note 2, at 15 (observing that transaction costs, including discov-
ering whom to deal with, are often sufficiently costly to prevent many otherwise desirable
transactions).
339 See generally D.P.U. 86-36-F, 98 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 82-83, 84 (consumers may
fail to make cost-effective choices due to lack of information); Union of Concerned Scientists,
Market Barriers (visited Feb. 10, 1998) <http://www.ucsusa.orgienergy/barriers.market.html >
(retail customers may have much less sophisticated understanding and modeling tools than
utilities and industrial communities who themselves undervalue renewable energy).
3" See genettitly D.P.U. 86-36-F, 98 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 82-83, 84.
341 See Decision 95-05-045, 161 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 258.
342 See generally D.P.U. 86-36-F, 98 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 82-83.
3" See id.; see also Decision 95-05-045, 161 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 258.
344 See D.P.U. 86-36-F, 98 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 82, 83. The DPU concluded consumers
did not invest in energy-efficient electrical appliances for two other important reasons. See id. at
83. Some consumers lack the capital to make the initial investments in cost-effective lighting,
appliances and other conservation options. See id. Electricity-saving devices often involve a higher
initial cost. See id. Consequently, lack of capital may result in consumer investment in devices
which arc cheaper in the short-run, but more costly over the long-run. See generally id. The DPU
further noted institutional barriers to investment in energy-efficient devices—for example, where
landlords install the lighting and appliances, but tenants pay the electricity bills. See id. The
landlord may therefore have an economic incentive to install cheaper lighting and appliances,
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method of meeting demand.'" Because these market imperfections led
to lack of investment in cost-effective conservation technologies, the
DPU required direct involvement of utilities in marketing and imple-
menting conservation options."' In other words, government had to
apply correctives to such market failures to capture the environmental
and least-cost benefits of such conservation technologies. 347 In the
telling example of cost-effective conservation appliances, the market
failed to advance the public objectives of least-cost and environmental
protection adequately. 318
A corollary to the problem of information costs is the fact that
small cost-advantages for a given electricity option may only be appar-
ent when aggregated over large numbers of consumers, and will not
readily appear when calculated at the level of a single consumer or
household.'" Aggregated demand has a bearing on information costs
in that it may be cost-effective for utilities or utility commissions ana-
lyzing the aggregated demand of tens of thousands of consumers to
hire expert staff to make comparisons on how to answer that demand
at the least cost. 35° In most cases it would not be equally cost-effective
for an individual consumer to hire such expertise."'
Mandatory labeling requirements, where electric companies distill
the research on the environmental impacts of their product and pre-
sent that information in a standardized format easily comparable to
other companies' products, is a necessary, partial step in correcting
this information costs probletn. 352 From the corporate standpoint, the
presentation of environmental impacts in readily comparable form is
only a market advantage to the few companies with the least polluting
generation of power.''' Thus, such labeling would not likely be done
since the higher operating costs will be borne by other economic actors. See id. The tenants may
not want to install energy-saving refrigerators, lighting fixtures, etc. since the duration of their
occupancy of the rental unit may be uncertain or limited. See id.; see also Rubin et al., supra note
325, at 264 (lack of information is one explanation for consumer failure to invest in cost-effective
electricity saving devices).
345 See generally D.P.U. 86-36-F, 98 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 83, 84.
346 See id. at 84.
347 See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
348 See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
348 See generally Navarro, supra note 109, at 388-389 (In a world of imperfect information
with significant transaction costs, larger customers with resources to fathom the market will have
better access to bargains than smaller customers . . . .''); Union of Concerned Scientists, supra
note 339 (retail customers may have much less sophisticated understanding and modeling tools
than utilities and industrial communities who themselves undervalue renewable energy).
350 See generally supra note 349.
331 See generally supra note 349.
352 See generally infra notes 353-59.
353 See generally supra note 5.
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by individual electric companies governed solely by profit and market
considerations."54 From a social standpoint, quick comparability of the
otherwise hidden environmental side-effects of electricity products
helps consumers allocate resources optimally, thus overcoming infor-
mation cost barriers to desirable transactions."' Mandatory electricity
labeling, properly done, is a clear case of regulatory intervention
helping achieve the optimal allocation of social resources where the
market itself would not have done so."56
b. Problems in Accounting Over Long Time Frames
In its analysis of the failure of consumers to invest in cost-effective
electricity-conserving appliances, the Massachusetts DPU concluded
that the time frame used by consumers to compare electricity options
was too short."57 Consumers may not evaluate energy-saving technolo-
gies on the ten- to twenty-year product life cycle over which the savings
occur, but may consider only those products with a short payback
period. 958 By contrast, the cost-effectiveness of utility investments in
generating facilities may be examined over payback periods as long as
twenty years."9 If consumers make purchases based on too short a
payback time frame, they may actually invest in more costly means of
meeting their demands, thereby leading to a failure of the market to
allocate resources efficiently."°
Where the costs of an electricity option are not fully manifest for
scores of years, or even centuries—as may be the case with the global
warming impacts of CO2 emissions—the inherent near-sightedness of
individual consumer choices based on price may be even more prob-
lematic."' At best, individuals have perhaps a fifty-year time frame for
analyzing the rationality of their own purchasing decisions, i.e., the
length of their adult lives."' Costs of a purchase that must be "paid"
154 See generally supra note 5.
355 See generally Union of Concerned Scientists, supra note 339.
356 See supra notes 344-55 and accompanying text.
357 See D.P.U. 86-36•F, 98 Pub. Util, Rep. 4th (PUR) at 82-83.
553 See id. at 83; Ralph C. Cavanagh, Least-Cost Planning Imperatives for Electric Utilities and
their Regulators, 10 Iinay. ENVTL. L. REV. 299,318 (1986); Rubin et al., supra note 325, at 263-64.
359 See, e.g., D.P.U. 86-36-F, Pub. Util. Rep, 4th (PUR) at 83.
360 See id. at 82-83.
561 See infra notes 362-69 and accompanying text.
362 See generally Global Climate Change: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural
Resources, 104th Cong. 25-26 (1996) (statement of Timothy E. Wirth, Under Secretary of State
for Global Affairs) (in understanding the limits and opportunities in what an industry can do,
we should be asking what does that industry want to look like in 2020,2030 or 2050); Picou,
supra note 1, at 26.
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more than fifty years into the future are probably ignored in making
current purchases, or so heavily discounted that they are, for all prac-
tical purposes, ignored." Thus, from the perspective of an individual
consumer, cheap natural gas-fired electricity today might be a rational
choice, even if it would cause global climate disaster a century from
now.36^
Unlike individuals, society must make decisions based on its needs
for centuries, since it will last longer than the individuals who comprise
it. 9 "5 Thus, what is rational from an individual economic point of view
may be irrational from a societal point of view. 366 Moreover, there arc
intergenerational inequities in making decisions now that have irre-
versible negative impacts on future generations.367 A decision by mil-
lions of individual market actors to burn off all of the earth's fossil
fuels now at maximum consumption rates at the cost of a depleted and
overheated earth, a century hence may represent such a disjuncture
between individual and social rationality.s 68 In such cases, particularly
363 See generally PIGOU, supra note 1, at 26-30 (analyzing discrepancy between valuation of
present satisfactions and satisfactions to be had in distant future); Cudahy, supra note 110, at 427
(markets not notable for long-term foresight).
364 See generally PLATER ET AL., supra note 4, at 30, 33 (interests of the future underrepre-
sented in market; unborn generations who will inherit environmental problems generated in this
century have no say in today's marketplace; efforts at monetization too heavily discount future
values, such as preserving natural patrimony for future generations); see also Union of Concerned
Scientists, supra note 339 (suggesting in deregulated electric market energy decisions will be made
using shorter payback periods than utility discounted rates generally used; even investments
cost-effective to society based on long-term economic savings will be ignored).
96£,
	 generally United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, art.
3, 31 I.L.M. 849, 854 (hereinafter Framework Convention on Climate Change] (parties should
protect climate system for benefit of present amid future generations); 1I.R. R. No. 102-474(1),
at 133 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A,N. at 1956 (in crafting EPAct legislators endeavored
to take the long view by developing infrastructure that will steadily improve our environment,
energy security into 21st century).
366 See, e.g., supra notes 362-65, infra note 367-69 and accompanying text.
"7 See generally GORE, supra note 5, at 190-91 (criticizing accepted formula of conventional
economics that heavily discounts value of resources to future generations; effect is to magnify the
power of current generation to compromise all future generations; need for intergenerational
equity not yet reflected in current economic system); K.S. SIIRADER-FRECIIETTE, BURYING UN-
CERTAINTY: RISK AND TICE CASE AGAINST GEOLOGICAL DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE 189-201
(1993) (summarizing philosophical and ethical arguments for a duty to future generations and
rebutting position that no duty is owed to future generations).
368 See Picou, supra note 1, at 28, 29; see also SIIRADER-FRECI1017E, Supra note 367, at 193
(at simplest level intergenerational equity means each generation will have same opportunity to
use resources like oil, clean air, soil, water or be compensated for the depletion of those
resources); Cudahy, supra note 110, at 426 (simple common-sense virtue of conserving energy
speaks for itself; waste is never sound policy). In 1932, in a disturbingly early framing of the
problem, Pigou wrote:
There is also waste, in the sense of injury to the sum total of economic satisfaction,
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where future consequences are extreme, society may not be able to
afford to let. the market alone make the decision." 69
Thus, while it may be correct that the current value of a given
power plant's or even state's contribution to global warming may be
small,'" a given state or nation may still want to spend more now on
non-0O2 emitting power sources."' This decision would be difficult
enough to make for politicians and regulators who arc paid to review
hundreds of pages of scientific reports and testimony; it is nearly
impossible for the market to make through the actions of individual
consumers." 7s Such a decision would likely be irrational in market terms
because of the low market value of events which may occur scores of
years into the future."' For situations where what is rational for society
is irrational for individual consumers, society may need to make and
implement investment decisions by non-market means."'
c, Problems in Accounting for Diffused Global Impacts and Impacts on
Community Members who have Little Cash
When the harms of pollution arc widely dispersed, and particu-
larly when the individuals harmed are not in a position to bargain with
the polluter, market failure is likely.'" In the context of electricity
production and global warming, this shortcoming of the market may
when one generation . . . uses up for trivial purposes a natural product which is
abundant now but which is likely to become scarce and not readily available, even
for every important purposes, to future generations, This sort of waste is illustrated
when enormous quantities of coal are employed in high-speed vessels in order to
shorten to a small degree the time of a journey that is already short. We cut an
hour off the time of our passage to New York at the cost of preventing, perhaps,
one of our descendants from making the passage at all.
Pigott, supra, at 28. Pigott's example raises clearly the general problem of non-conservation for
the future, even though we know that technology may be able to compensate for resource
destruction in some cases, as here, where oil-powered transoceanic travel has now replaced
coal-powered. See id.
369 See, e.g., id. at 29 (wide agreement that government should protect interests of future in
some degree against irrational discounting and our preference for ourselves over our descen-
dants).
37° See, e.g., josxow, supra note 8, at 11; Black & Pierce, supra note 80, at 1417-18.
371
 See generally Picou, 31411111 note 1, at 28-30.
372 See generally Union of Concerned Scientists, supra note 339.
"See generally GORE, supra note 5, at 191 (our economic system does not measure effect of
decisions on future generations).
374 See generallyPtGou, supra note 1, at 29-30 (clear duty of government as trustee for unborn
and present generations to defend, by legislative enactment if necessary, exhaustible resources
from reckless spoliation).
3" See PLATER ET AL., supra note 4, at 32; see also Coasc, supra note 2, at 18 (governmental
regulation may lead to improvements in economic efficiency when, as is normally the case with
July 19981
	
ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION	 1041
be best illustrated by the problem of small islands far removed from
the consumption transactions of the American electricity system. 376 As
discussed above, consumption of cheap fossil-fuel fired electricity prod-
ucts may superficially benefit American consumers in terms of price,
but lead to increased global warming which may cause territorial losses
for some small islands. 3  With the difficulty of foreign access to Ameri-
can courts, alongside difficulties of proving causation, legal remedies
for these island losses seem unlikely. 378 But even if monetary compen-
sation to islanders could somehow be imposed on American producers
and consumers of electricity, there may be no sum of money adequate
to compensate for the loss of ancestral homelands. 373 Similarly, Ameri-
cans' sense of neighborliness, empathy or equity may make us unwill-
ing to have our electricity system impose such burdens on others even
if we paid more for the privilege of doing so. 38°
A related problem of the market is that it fails to recognize the
needs of community members who have little cash. 33 ' In weighing the
diminution in property value or the increased expenditures in reme-
dial health care of a poor community due to global warming against
the income savings of wealthy communities consuming large amounts
of cheaper electricity, the cost-benefit balance may be unfairly skewed
to the latter. 382 The undesirably skewed outcome in letting the market
"solve" the emissions problems of the developed world at the expense
of the poorer developing world is apparent, for example, in current
smoke nuisance, large numbers of people are involved and therefore transaction costs of handling
the problem through the market would be high).
376 See generally supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
377 See generally supra note 376.
378 See, e.g., Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Stipp. 1324, 1355, 1372-73 (S.D. Tex. 1995)
(dismissing under doctrine of forum non convcniens suit by thousands of foreign farinworker-
plaintiffs alleging injury by U.S. pesticide used on farms abroad).
376 See generally GELBSPAN, supra note 188, at 109 (quoting Samoan Ambassador's comment
that "we will not allow some to barter our homelands . . . for short-term economic interest"); id.
at 186 (quoting noted scientist's observation that "(ilt may be cost-effective, for example, to
relocate the inhabitants of the Marshall Islands . . but it wouldn't be moral"); Navarro, supra
note 109, at 399 (marketed goods, like hamburgers, easy to value because they are regularly sold
in the marketplace at posted prices; much more difficult to value non•marketed goods, such as
clean air, because there are few if any markets where such amenities are bought and sold at posted
prices).
9" See generally Union of Concerned Scientists, Energy Solutions to Fight Global Warming
(visited Feb. 10, 1998) Chttp://www.ucsusa.org/energyienergy.gwsolutions.hunl > (as largest
contributor of CO2 emissions U.S, bears special responsibility for curbing global warming); infra
note 409.
381 See generally PLATER ET Al.., supra note 4, at 30.
382 See generally infra notes 384-89 and accompanying text.
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discussions on "joint implementation" strategies for addressing the
high CO2 emissions of the industrialized world.383
Under joint implementation, a developed nation would not have
to meet its emissions reductions targets within its own borders if, by
acting jointly with another nation, it could meet reductions targets
through actions there. 384 Under such a scheme, a developed country
could continue its CO2 emissions from electric generating stations, but
make up for them in the developing world by funding CO2 emissions
reduction or the creation of carbon dioxide "sinks," like forest pre-
serves, there.385
 Because preserving forest land and other remedial
actions arc often cheaper in the developing nations than in the devel-
oped world, such an approach is cost-effective and thus desirable in
market terms. 386 But joint implementation has proven controversial,
particularly among the developing countries. 387 Understandably, a plan
where the United States will continue driving high fuel consumption
cars and using large quantities of fossil-fuel fired electricity, while in
exchange developing countries will submit to foreigners buying their
forests and putting them off limits to local economic use, does not
strike many in the developing world as the best approach to CO2
reduction. 3B8
 When there are gross disparities in purchasing power
between the world's human communities, cost-benefit market-based
decisionmaking may distribute costs to the poor and benefits to the
weal thy. 389
385 See generally infra notes 384-89 and accompanying text.
384
 See generally International Energy Agency, Climate Change Policy, supra note 189, at 15.
585 See, e.g., supra note 193. See generally Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra
note 365, art. 3:3, 31 at 854 (efforts to address climate change may be carried out
cooperatively by adherent nations); International Energy Agency, Climate Change Policy, supra note
189, at 15, 16 (many joint implementation efforts involving companies have involved afforestation
projects in developing countries).
386 See, e.g., Global Climate Change: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural
Resources, 104th Cong. 32-33 (1996) (statement of Senator Kyl) (arguing there are greater
opportunities for emissions control in Third World countries in terms of cost/benefit than there
arc in the developing nations);
sH7
 See, e.g., International Energy Agency, Climate Change Policy, supra note 189, at 15;
Lemonick, supra note 193, at 24.
388 See generally International Energy Agency, Climate Change Policy, supra note 189, at 15; see
also Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 365, art. 9:5, 31 1.L.M. at 855
(cooperation by adherent nations should lead to sustainable economic growth and development
in all adherents, particularly developing countries). Energy efficiency and alternative energy
technology transfers, however, might prove more acceptable forms of joint implementation. See
generally Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 365, art. 4:5, 31 I.L.M. at 858
(developed countries shall take all practicable steps to facilitate transfer of environmentally sound
technology, particularly to developing countries); International Energy Agency, Climate Change
Policy, supra, at 175 (Clinton administration believes there is substantial potential in joint imple-
mentation projects, perhaps involving technology transfers).
589 See supra notes 384-88.
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While the market. often undervalues the needs of poor human
communities because of their meager purchasing power, the market
usually completely ignores the needs of non-human communities for
similar reasons."° Even if trees may occasionally have standing, they
definitely have no purchasing power."' Thus, the last surviving colony
of an endangered alpine wildflower species about to be extinguished
by climate change, for example, has no way to register its own "de-
mands" in market terms.'" Unless someone with cash, or property
rights exchangeable for cash, somehow sets a price on such a loss, the
market will probably not recognize the loss.'"
d. The Problem of Uncertain Harms; the Precautionary Principle
Uncertain harms may also be very difficult for market mechanisms
to handle appropriately."' Price, in part, reflects a summation of all
past production costs of a product and all future costs which may be
properly assessed against the product."' Future costs, however, may not
be easily predictable."' Some cost-benefit accounting appears to as-
sume each additional ton of CO2 added to the atmosphere produces
a proportional additional global warming harm as compared to each
prior ton of CO2 in a smooth linear progression.'" Where such a linear
progression exists, a simple cost-benefit calculus of marginal costs
versus marginal harms might make some sense, with every additional
ton of CO2 being counted as equivalent to a prior ton.'"
Climate scientists have noted, however, that the climate system is
non-linear in nature and future changes may involve surprises, particu-
larly when the system is rapidly forced.'" Thus, there may be one or
more environmental thresholds, below which the harm of additional
390 See, e.g., GORE, supra note 5, at 183; PLATER ET AL., supra note 4, at 31.
m See generally Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 11.3. 727, 741-43 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(concern for protection of nature should lead to conferral of standing upon trees and other
environmental objects to sue for their own preservation); PLATER El' AL., supra note 4, at 31 (trees
do not buy and sell).
392 See generally John R. Luoma, Warming the Wild, AtinutsoN, July-Aug. 1996, at 102, 104
(reporting troubling news for rare alpine flowers; warmer, drier climate would lead to elimination
of some rare alpine plants); Paul Rauber, Heat Wave: If We Continue to Ignore the Danger Signs
the World of the Future Will Be a !loiter, Poorer, Deadlier Place, SIERRA, Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 34, 38
(suggesting alpine species moving upwards to escape global warming effects may run out of
mountain),
393 See generally GORE, supra note 5, at 183.
"4 See generally infra notes 399-400,
393 See generally supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
396 See, e.g., infra notes 399-400 and accompanying text.
397 See, e.g., josxow supra note 8, at 6 & fig. 1, 7.
393 See generally supra note 395 and accompanying text.
399 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 182, § 6.
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CO2 is minimal and can be absorbed by atmospheric systems, and
above which the harm of the additional tonnage is severe or acceler-
ated."' Determining the correct environmental costs in such instances
will be problematic if the exact thresholds are not known. Thus, even
where price reflects environmental costs, if those costs arc unlikely to
increase in a predictable, linear fashion, the market may undervalue
the impacts of additional production and fail to allocate resources
appropriately. 401
Where the exact parameters of environmental consequences arc
unknown, the international consensus expressed in both the Rio Prin-
ciples and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change is to adopt a precautionary approach: 1'2
 As expressed by the
Framework Convention on Climate Change, this approach means that
where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental dam-
age, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing preventative or mitigating measures.'" As applied to the
electricity industry, a precautionary approach may mean that crude
price mechanisms are inappropriate regulators where greenhouse
gases arc involved."' Until the causal links of the global warming
problem arc more precisely understood, so that one ton of CO2 is
known to cause about $X in harm, a precautionary approach argues
against reliance on price alone as a guide to the optimal quantity of
fossil-fueled electricity generation.'"
4°I) See generally WORKING GROUP II ..to THE SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 184, at 5 (ecological and social systems
complex, with many non-linear feedbacks; as future climate extends beyond impacts of past
climate variation it becomes more likely actual outcomes will include surprises and unanticipated
rapid changes).
401
 See generally supra note 400 and accompanying text.
402 See The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15, June 13, 1992,
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 31 I.L.M. 876, 879; Framework
Convention on Climate Change, supra note 365, art. 3:3, 31 I.L.M. at 854.
401 See Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 365, art. 3:3, 31 I.L.M. at 854.
The Convention does recognize, however, that even measures to deal with climate change should
be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost; and that economic
development is an essential aspect of climate change measures. See id; see also id. art. 12:4, 31
LL.M. at 865 (developing countries proposing climate protective projects for financing may
include estimate of incremental costs and benefits); id. art. 4:7, 31 1.L.M. at 858 (extent develop-
ing countries will implement Convention commitments will take into account that economic and
social development and poverty eradication arc priorities of developing country parties).
4°4 See supra notes 399-403 and accompanying text.
905 See generally supra notes 399-404 and accompanying text.
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e. The Problem of the Market's Inability to Value Non Market Social
Goals
For individuals and for societies, cost-effectiveness is not the only
grounds for making investment decisions." 6 It was probably not "cost-
effective," for example, to build a National Park system, nor to launch
a program to land humans on the moon. Left to the market, these
types of projects would probably not have been undertaken. The mar-
ket might determine the most cost-effective means to achieve such
goals—it might even render such goals infeasible—but it did not, and
probably could not, on its own begin to mobilize resources for such
goals. There was no clear profit in such projects. Paybacks, if any, were
decades away; thus, real arid substantial costs outweighed uncertain
benefits. Consequently, these projects, though nationally desirable,
were not the kind of undertakings endorsed by the market. The market
may be similarly ill-equipped to initiate important environmental goals,
such as a habitable, biologically diverse planet in the year 2198. 4°7
In addressing a problem like global warming, which is caused in
part by electricity generation's CO2 emissions, numerous legitimate
non-market-based motivations are conceivable, including altruistic,
good neighbor motives and equity considerations." 8 The United States
might, for example, want to act as a good neighbor to keep small island
nations from drowning in rising seas due to global warming.' It might
wish to do so even if the costs of such action outweigh any costs to
American electricity consumers caused by the loss of island nations.'"°
Similarly, equity considerations, or a sense that reparations are
due, might motivate the United States to make sharp greenhouse gas
emissions reductions now in order to compensate for its high volume
of prior emissions." Such action would be legitimate even if the con-
4°6 See generally Picou, supra note 1, at 11-13 (distinguishing between economic and non-
economic welfare).
4 u7 See generally GORE, supra note 5, at 190 (past a certain point, it is impossible to price
environmental effects; value of clean air and water, abundance of life on earth is incalculable).
40E1 See, e.g., infra notes 409-10 and accompanying text.
11PJ See generally Mass. Enviro Official Warns Midwest Regulators, supra note 32 (quoting Mass.
DEP Commissioner David Suuhs' observation that we all bear a "common responsibility ... to
something higher than shareholders. And that's the health and well-being of neighbors."); Black
& Pierce, supra note 80, at 1418 (introducing an altruism factor strengthens the case for green-
house gas environmental adders); see also Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note
365, art. 4:8(a), 31 I.L.M. at 858 (parties shall consider actions necessary to meet specific needs
of developing country parties arising from climate change, especially on small island countries);
supra notes 187-88.
41° See generally supra note 409.
1 " See, e.g., GELBS PAN, supra note 188, at 112 (quoting Chinese environmental official's
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sequent costs to American electricity consumers exceed the global
warming harms that those consumers would individually avoid by re-
ducing their emissions.'" Given that the developing world may need
to give priority to poverty eradication over greenhouse gas contain-
ment, it may be especially important for the United States and other
developed nations to reduce emissions at a level proportional to or
greater than their histoAc contributions to the causes of the climate
problem.'"
Although no national consensus has expressly endorsed these
non-market motivations, a general consensus favoring environmental
objectives has long been evident in electricity regulatory statutes.4 "
Moreover, the United States has ratified the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, agreeing to the international
goal of stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at levels
that do not dangerously interfere with the climate system.''' Further-
more, both Congress and the state legislatures have repeatedly shown
a willingness to subsidize—i.e., to undertake even where not cost-effec-
tive—environmentally preferable forms of electricity generation. 416
Thus, it is inappropriate to assume that the American people want only
those environmental protection measures that arc "cost-effective" and
that our electricity generation system must make all of its investment
decisions based simply on market price. 417
comment that "80 percent of the world's pollution is caused by the developed countries and they
should be responsible for those problems").
412 See generally Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 365, art. 3:1, 31 I.L.M.
at 854 (on basis of equity, differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, developed
countries should take lead in combating climate change); see also id. art. 4:2(a), 31 LL.M. at 856
(des-eloped countries taking lead in controlling climate change taking into account need for
equitable and appropriate contributions by each of the parties). The United States has repeatedly
been the source of 22-23% of the entire world output of CO2 from energy use and production.
See International Energy Agency, Climate Change Policy, supra note 189, at 24-26 tbls.4-6. Even
compared to many other developed countries, we have double to quadruple the CO2 emissions
per capita of most other nations. See id.
413 See generally Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 365, arts. 3:1, 4:7, 31
I.L.M. at 858.
414
 See, e.g.. supra notes 64-71, 77, 89-93, 121-26, 143, 161-62 and accompanying text.
415 Ste Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 365, arts. 2, 4:2(a), 31 I.L.M.
at 854, 856; International Energy Agency, Climate Change Policy, supra note 189, at 11, 175. One
of the aims of the Convention is to return the carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions
of the parties to their 1990 levels. See Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra, art.
4:2(b), 31 I.L.M. at 857.
416 See, e.g., supra notes 258-63 and accompanying text.
417 See supra note 416. By way of comparison it is useful to note that the public goal of around
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C. Advantages and Disadvantages of Possible Regulatory Mechanisms
for Controlling Environmental Externalities in the Context of a
Restructured Industry
1. Externality Adders and Their Problems
As discussed above, price has repeatedly failed to direct the elec-
tricity industry in ways necessary to protect the environment,'" Given
this history of price failure and the fact that global warming may well
lit many of the criteria for situations where price has inherent limita-
tions—for example, having impacts that are geographically dispersed,
that develop over long time periods and that may invoke non-market
social concerns—interventions in the market are probably needed to
protect the environment.'" Various possible market intervention meas-
ures may offer advantages over price alone, but they also carry disad-
vantages. 420
Neither the Massachusetts nor California restructuring statutes
expressly utilize externality adders to level the playing field between
combustion and non-combustion, power sources.'m Because their ex-
ternality adder programs explicitly focused on the problems of envi-
ronmental externalities, and because they were such well-developed
and widely debated corrective programs, a discussion of adders is
useful in clarifying the limitations of other market intervention mecha-
n ism 5. 422
Monetized externality adder programs like California's and Mas-
sachusetts', although meant to correct the failings of the market, arc
themselves essentially market-based mechanisms. 423 Environmental ad-
der programs attempted to adjust the mix of electric generation/con-
servation options used by assigning an additional environmental cost
the clock electricity availability and reliability is taken as a given by regulators and market
advocates alike. See, e.g., Rodgers & Schuler Jr., supra note 175, at 28-29 (quoting executive
director of National Association of Regulatory Commissioners' observation that reliable service
will continue to be a goal for restructured industry); see also Southern Cal. Edison Co., 71 F.E.R,C.
1 61,269, at 62,081, 62,082 (June 2, 1995) (Massey, Comm'n, concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (a ruling eliminating consideration of environmental non-price factors, if strictly con-
strued, might prevent consideration of range of other non-price factors that are important but
very difficult to assign a dollar value to such as fuel diversity).
415 See, e.g., supra notes 64-71, 319, 340-48 and accompanying text.
412 See, e.g., supra notes 357-98 and accompanying text.
42° See infra notes 921-79 and accompanying text.
421 See generally supra notes 260-68,
122 See infra notes 423-60 and accompanying text.
422 See, e.g., D.P.U. 89-239, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 97, 98.
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factor."' The decision between options, however, was still made on a
cost-benefit basis 445
 In discussing how to value environmental adders,
for example, the Massachusetts DPU suggested that if the price advan-
tage of a more polluting electricity option is greater than the value of
environmental damages caused by that option, "it would be to society's
net benefit to prefer the dirtier resource." 426 This type of cost-benefit
calculation is, in essence, a market approach. Thus, paradoxically,
while the need to create adders was an implicit criticism of the market's
failure to address certain environmental problems, certain difficulties
with environmental adders may be due to the fact that they were
themselves market-based mechanisms."'
Beyond the narrow critiques the Supreme Judicial Court and
FERC levied against utility commission externality adder programs,
wider criticisms were made.'" Some critics argued that by insisting on
such environmental adders for electricity, but not for other competing
industries—e.g., heating oil for heating buildings, gasoline for power-
ing cars, etc.—the adders may have actually harmed the environment
by making electricity seem more costly in environmental terms than
other industries which simply had not been scrutinized.429 Thus, argu-
ably, adders might have shifted investment and consumption to dirtier
industries.48° This problem exists whenever alternative products arc not
simultaneously and uniformly regulated."' The fact the regulation of
powerplant smokestacks under the Clean Air Act may cause some to
heat with polluting woodstoves rather than electricity, for example, is
424 See supra notes 203-21 and accompanying text.
425 See, e.g., D.P.U. 89-239,116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 89,92. As the DPU claimed:
Economic theory posits that it is appropriate to value the avoidance of environ-
mental externalities at the intersection of the marginal cost and marginal benefit
curves of pollution abatement. It is at the intersection of the marginal cost and
marginal benefit curves of pollution control where societal value is maximized and,
thus, defines the market-clearing price or equilibrium value of avoiding environ-
mental externalities.
See D.P.U. 89-239,116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 92. The DPU suggested that where pollution
control was occurring in excess of the optimal—indicated by the intersection of the marginal
cost and benefit curves—"societal value" would be enhanced by reducing the amount of pollution
control being practiced. See id.
426
 Id. at 90.
422
 See generally supra notes 423-26 and accompanying text.
429 See, e.g., JosKow, supra note 8, at 1, 21; Black & Pierce, supra note 80, at 1398-1430; Gary
& Teague, supra note 238, at 870-75.
429 See Black & Pierce, supra note 80, at 1406; see alsojosKow, supra note 8, at 19 (piecemeal
control of utilities only may shift production to another economic sector, reducing or reversing
environmental gains).
43° See Black & Pierce, supra note 80, at 1402,1406.
431 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 91-1146 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5358 (promul-
gation of federal emissions standards under Clean Air Amendments will preclude efforts on part
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not sufficient reason to abandon the regulation of powerplants.""
Rather, it argues for equivalent regulation of the substituted forms of
energy as well.'" Consumer substitution of dirtier energy sources can
be avoided in future regulatory efforts through consistent regulation
of CO2 throughout the restructured electricity industry and in alterna-
tive energy forms as well.'"
Similarly, some criticized state regulation because the higher costs
caused by state-imposed environmental adders may have put a given
state's utilities at a disadvantage relative to out-of-state generators who
may have been causing even more pollution.'" Notably, however, state
adder programs, which often dealt with CO2 emissions, were installed
in the absence of any federal emissions control over CO2. 4" Thus, at
least in terms of CO2, this criticism is misdirected—the problem was
not state regulation, but lack of national regulation.'" Nevertheless,
state-by-state regulation of air pollutants is problematic in an industry,
like electricity, that will be shipping its product interstate. 4' This prob-
lem could be corrected by national CO2 emissions standards, interstate
compacts or other mechanisms that prevent states from gaining com-
petitive advantage by weak emissions regulation.'"
Opponents of adders complained that calculating a dollar value
for externalities is difficult and necessarily speculative."' It is true that
of states to compete with each other to attract new plants without assuring adequate control of
large-scale emissions).
432 See generally William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the
Public Interest—EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 62, 68 (1987) (discussing addition
of woodstovc air emissions regulations under the Clean Air Act nearly two decades after power-
plant emissions were regulated; noting that, other than cars and trucks, no consumer goods were
previously regulated by EPA under the Clean Air Act); see also 40 C.F.R. § 60.530 et seq. (1997)
(air emissions standards for woodstoves made after July 1, 1988; provisions do riot apply to
woodstoves made previously nor to masonry fireplaces).
433 See generally Black & Pierce, supra note 80, at 1406, 1407 (discussing problem of substitu-
tion of dirtier, less regulated fuels when emissions of competing power sources arc not similarly
regulated).
434 See general15, supra notes 429-33 and accompanying text.
435 See D.P.U. 86-36-C, at 81; see also JosKow, supra note 8, at 15 (mixing states with adders
and states without adders could have unintended adverse consequences); Black & Pierce, supra
note 80, at 1415-16 (geographic substitution where consumers relocate to less regulated state
limits effectiveness of some local environmental regulation; solution may require regional, na-
tional or international regulation).
436 See, e.g., Josxow, supra note 8, at 9, 11, 18.
437 See generally supra note 436 and accompanying WM.
438 See generally 11.1.R. REP. No. 91-1146 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5358.
439 See, e.g., infra note 492.
44° See generally D.P.U. 89-239, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 90 (costs of environmental
damages are difficult to estimate); Mack & Pierce, supra note 80, at 1427 (estimating marginal
harm attributable to emissions of various pollutants an "extraordinarily difficult task"). The proxy
method for calculating externalities—cost-of-control (implied valuation)—used in many adder
programs is even more speculative, and drew the sharpest condemnations by critics. See, e.g.,
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the calculation of externalities is inherently difficult, given the dif-
ficulty of tallying the actual environmental damages attributable to a
given powerplant or fuel."' The difficulty of professionally estimating
appropriate price signals for these costs underscores the improbability
that individual consumers, unaware of the possible environmental
costs of electricity production, could determine the appropriate price
to pay for that electricity. 4"2
 The fact that the rational price for electric-
ity from a given source, accounting for all of its indirect, multi-variable
and long-term consequences, may be difficult or impossible to calcu-
late suggests that the market price of that electricity may not always be
a rational price."3
 This potential irrationality of the market price of
electricity provides another reason for skepticism regarding the use of
the market alone to allocate resources in the electricity industry. 444
Two widely cited critics of environmental adders/externality pro-
grams, Professors Bernard Black and Richard Pierce, have argued that
at the level of a given state there was little cost-benefit rationale for
substantial adders to control greenhouse gases." 5
 They suggest that any
factor for the fraction of the total harm from such emissions actually
experienced within the state would be minuscule. 446 Consequently, the
net in-state benefit to be realized from each ton of greenhouse gas
emissions reduced would be relatively small. 447 Thus, they argue that
any case for state environmental adders for greenhouse gases rests
almost entirely on altruism. 448
In terms of global warming, they assert, one state acting alone, or
even one country acting alone, can accomplish little except self-impov-
erishment. 449 This argument is unconvincing, however, when applied
to this country and its electricity industry. 450 The United States is the
source of over a fifth of the world's CO2 generation and its electricity
production is responsible for approximately seven percent of the world
D.P.U. 89-239, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 71, 90-93; josxow, supra note 8, at 16; Black &
Pierce, supra note 80, at 1402, 1420-21, 1422.
441 See D.P.U. 89-239, 116 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 90.
442 See
 generally PIGOU, supra note 1, at 195 (in certain planning contexts expecting coherent
plan from independent activities of isolated speculators is like expecting satisfactory painting to
be made if each square inch is painted by an independent artist).
495
	 generally supra notes 440-42 and accompanying text.
444 See generally supra notes 440-49 and accompanying text.
445 See Black & Pierce, supra note 80, at 1416-18.
446 See id. at 1417.
447 See id.
448 See id.
448 See id. at 1418, 1425; see also Josxow, supra note 8, at 11 (suggesting nothing a single state
alone can do to significantly affect global warming).
45° See infra note 451 and accompanying text.
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CO2 output:15 ' Thus, although it is true that world cooperation on the
problem is needed, the United States and its electricity industry bear
tremendous responsibility for global warming compared to other na-
tions and industries:152
Black and Pierce's criticism on this point implies that if environ-
mental adders for greenhouse gases were priced in market terms, to
reflect the marginal harms actually experienced in-state for every ad-
ditional ton of greenhouse gas emitted, the adders would drop to an
extremely small value 4n The marginal harm of global warming to the
consumers of a state, they imply, would be so small that the correct
price for an additional ton of CO2 emitted by the electricity purchases
of those consumers in the state would be next to nothing.^ 54
If Black and Pierce are correct, their analysis points to a more
fundamental problem with environmental externality programs: if
priced by market rules they might not be able to deal effectively with
global environmental problems.455 The implication is that any correctly
priced adder for CO2's environmental costs would be so small it would
not deter consumers from selecting electricity from a high CO2 output
fuel or facility. 456 But pricing adders by market rules confines them to
harms and benefits cognizable in economic or price terms.'" The
non-price advantages of centuries-long global sustainability or respect
for small island states' traditional homelands, for example, would still
go unrecognized in selecting electricity generation options. 958 When
Black and Pierce and other critics point to the infinitesimal global
warming costs of the CO2 emissions for a given power plant, they may
be right that any substantial environmental adder would overstate the
correct market price of the CO2 emissions. 456 But this observation just
confirms that the market is not an adequate mechanism for recogniz-
ing and addressing certain types of socially-borne harms. 46°
451 See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text; see also josKow, supra note 8, at 11 (U.S.
electric industry accounts for about 6% of world CO2 emissions).
452 See supra notes 450-51 and accompanying text.
453 See Black & Pierce, supra note 80, at 1416, 1417.
454
 See generally id.
455 See generally id. at 1416-18.
455 See generally id.
457 See generally PlGOU, supra note 1, at 11-13 (distinguishing between economic and non-
economic welfare).
453 See generally supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
46° See, e.g., Black & Pierce, supra note 80, at 1416-17,1425.
46° See supra notes 455-59 and accompanying text.
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2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Emission Taxes and Subsidies
for Renewables and Conservation
Absent taxes on CO2 emissions, or subsidies or other supports for
renewable energy, environmentally preferable power options may have
difficulty making progress in a competitive electricity market. 46' It is
widely expected, for example, that renewable power from solar, wind,
geothermal and other sources will cost more than conventional
power—perhaps ten to twenty percent more. 462 Although some niche
marketers may sell their power based on its renewable energy content,
most electricity will be marketed and purchased on the basis of low
price rather than environmental considerations, if California is any
indication.'" Subsidies for renewable energy and emissions taxes on
combustion-based power sources could be used, however, to adjust
market prices enough that price-based consumer choices harmonize
with national environmental objectives.'"
Even some of the critics of adders are interested in the possibility
of emissions taxes (i.e., Pigovian taxes) as a market-based mechanism
for addressing externalities like the impacts of CO2." 5 Tax structures
have long been used to encourage various types of energy develop-
ment—the depletion allowance for oil, natural gas and coal, for exam-
ple, cost the federal government an estimated $745 million in lost tax
revenues in 1992.466 CO2 emissions taxes would likely encourage renew-
able energy and conservation, and discourage polluting fossil fuels,
such as coal, oil and to a lesser extent, natural gas.'"
A distinct advantage to emissions taxes, if applied across all sources
and not just to electricity generation stations, is that they would prevent
the substitution of dirtier, unregulated forms of energy for heavily
461 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 327, at D4 (battle over California's electricity market will be
waged mostly on price). But see id. (surveys suggest that 70% of Americans might embrace green
power if prices not too far out of line; early reports suggest green power marketing tests drawing
20% of customers). •
462 See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 256, at Bl; Natural Resources Defense Council, supra note
278 (noting price of selected low environmental impact electricity offerings is 10-20% above
current consumer rate).
405 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 327, at 04.
464 See infra notes 475-79 arid accompanying text.
465
 See, e.g., Josxow, , supra note 8, at 3; see also supra note 2. But see Karen Tumulty, A Treaty
Meets a Sour Congress, TIME, Dec. 22, 1997, at 27, 27 (White House has "completely ruled out"
use of taxes to meet climate treaty goals).
466 See Union of Concerned Scientists, Unequal Tax Burdens (visited Feb. 10, 1998)
Chttp://www.ucsusa ,org/eriergy/barriers.taxes,htnil>; Energy Info. Admin., supra note 10, at
117; sec also Energy Info. Admin., supra note 1, at 1 (long history of government intervention to
stimulate oil and gas production dates back to World War I).
467 See generally supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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environmentally regulated electricity:168 Similarly, if the taxes were na-
tional in scope, and not just state-imposed, environmental controls
would not act as an incentive to relocate energy facilities to other,
less-regulated jurisdictions. 469 Taxes would also have to be applied to
older facilities, and not just newly built facilities, or they would act as
an incentive to overuse older, dirtier generating stations:17 "
One difficulty with taxes, however, is determining the level of
taxation necessary to achieve the desired level of pollution reduc-
tion.47 ' Moreover, monitoring emissions to determine the appropriate
level of taxation may lead to many of the bureaucratic intrusions and
record-keeping problems critics of command-and-control hoped to
avoid with a market-based approach. 472 Monitoring numerous small
sources of CO2 emissions could prove more costly than conventional
command-and-control regulation. 475 In addition, if such taxes are not
made "revenue neutral" by corresponding cuts in other taxes, they
might act as a general drag on the economy, and not just on the dirtiest
portions of the economy. 474
Subsidies of conservation measures and electricity generated us-
ing renewable energy would accomplish the same ends as emissions
taxes, but by using opposite means. 47' Such subsidies would increase
consumer purchases of renewables-based electricity, while emissions
taxes would decrease consumer purchases of fossil-fuel fired electricity.
There certainly can be no complaints from the other power sources
about subsidizing renewable energy—most other methods of generat-
ing electricity, such as nuclear, coal, oil and large-scale hydroelectric,
have received extensive subsidization from the federal government. 476
468 See generally JosKow, , supra note 8, at 18 (optimal solution to externalities might be
through emissions fcc if applied to all sources of a given pollutant).
4E3 See JosKow , supra note 8, at 19 (state commissions not well-suited to regulate emissions
with global and regional impacts); see also H.R. REP, No. 91-1146, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5358 (giving rationale fin-federal as opposed to state-by-state air emission regulation under Clean
Air Act).
175 See generally Iribe, supra note 13 (older plants have been allowed to pollute at higher rates
than new plants; restructured power market should not allow older plants a pricing edge simply
because have largely avoided pollution controls).
471 See PLATER ET M.., supra note 4, at 51.
472 See generally, Black & Pierce, supra note 80, at 1392.
473 See id.
474 See generally Biewald, supra note 308, at 42 (suggesting revenue-neutral taxes that reduce
tax on income while increasing taxes on air emissions).
17° See generally infra notes 476-78.
476 See, e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists, Commercialization Barriers to Renewable Energy
(visited Feb, 10, 1998) Chttp://www.ucsusa.orgienergy/barricrs.commercial.html > (citing U.S.
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At first glance subsidization appears to conflict with the goal of
least-cost power, because it would prop up expensive energy sources.477
There is some hope, however, that further subsidies of solar and other
renewable energy forms may create a large enough market for these
forms of energy that economics of scale and further technical innova-
tion may actually bring down their cost per kWh generated. 478 Further-
more, by reducing environmental externalities, renewably generated
electricity may actually be least-cost power from a societal standpoint. 479
D. Using Price and Non-Price Mechanisms to Eliminate Externalities in
the Context of Electricity Restructuring in California and Massachusetts
The analysis above suggests that the market is likely to be a weak
method of addressing environmental impacts, particularly where, as
with the problem of CO2 emissions and global warming, the impacts
arc fully manifest only in the distant future, the impacts arc diffused
geographically and over millions of persons, the complexities of cau-
sation may make the information costs too high for optimal consumer
choice and significant non-market social goals are involved."B 0 Implic-
itly realizing the limitations of a pure market approach to environ-
mental issues, the Massachusetts and California electricity restructur-
ing statutes have numerous provisions that soften, constrain or correct
the shortcomings of the market."' The statutes, however, do not go as
far as they should in addressing the public objectives of least-cost power
and environmental protection.482
First, the statutes ignore some of the problems whose market-in-
visibility triggered externality programs in the first place, notably the
CO2 emissions problem of an electricity generating system based on
fossil-fuel combustion." 5 The plans will, for example, likely result in
increased natural gas use, and possibly greater coal use, both sig-
Dept. of Energy study showing S23,5 billion in federal research and development expenditures
for nuclear power, S12,9 billion for coal and $2.8 billion for oil and natural gas compared with
$9.3 billion for renewable energy and $4.7 billion for energy efficiency); ENERGY INFO. ADM1N„
supra note 10, at 44 (nuclear and coal absorbed two-thirds of 1992 federal applied research and
development expenditures).
477 See generally supra note 462.
47B
	
e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists, supra note 476 (noting 20-25% reduction in cost
for each doubling of production volume of photovoltaic units; without government support of
such renewables, ability to reap economies of scale likely to be delayed).
479
 See, e.g., supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
480 See supra notes 357-417 and accompanying text.
491 See, e.g., .supra notes 260-68 and accompanying text.
482 See infra notes 483-98 and accompanying text.
4" See, e.g., supra note 291 and accompanying text.
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nificant sources of CO2 emissions."' Reduction in the price of electric-
ity—a fundamental goal of deregulation—could, in itself, spur in-
creased consumption of electricity. 485 Any resulting increase in electric-
ity consumption, absent other compensating changes, will likely
increase CO2 emissions.486
Second, particularly in light of the CO2 problem, it is not enough
to use renewable energy and conservation subsidies or portfolio man-
dates to change the ratio of fossil-fuel generation to renewables or
conservation in the electricity resource mix. 487 The ratio of fuel types
within the fossil-fuel component needs to be altered if we want to
reduce CO2 emissions from the electricity-generation sector.488 More
coal-fired generation, even if it is cheaper than gas-fired generation, is
not desirable, even if the sum of the two goes down slightly due to
subsidized renewables-based electricity generation. 189 Coal produces
more CO2 per unit of energy than natural gas does and, unfortunately,
it currently fuels more than three times the electricity generation that
gas does.49° Without environmental adders, carbon emissions taxes or
other penalties on CO2 output, cost advantages for coal could maintain
or increase its use, thereby increasing global warming."' Thus, electric-
4144 See generally Woolf Sc Biewald, supra note 107, at 66, 64 (in restructured industry natural
gas likely to be main source of new generation and CO2 emissions will continue to climb).
485 See generally Cushman, supra note 335, at A22 (relatively low energy prices arc one cause
of growing U.S. energy use in 1996, suggests director of American Council for an Energy-Efficient
Economy).
186 See id. This tension points to certain contradictions in the simultaneous goals of least-cost
electricity generation and generation that protects the environment. The details of the balance
between these two goals will need periodic readjustment as our understanding of global warming
increases.
487 See generally D.P.U. 89-239, 116 Pub. Util, Rep. 4th (PUR) at 92 (estimation of externali-
ties also essential for comparing different generating facilities whose fuel and other differences
lead to different pollution impact and not just for comparing non-polluting and polluting
options),
4B8 See generally id.
489 g Woolf & Biewald, supra note 107, at 67 (if gas-fired generating facilities replace older,
less efficient coal plants, CO2 emissions would likely decline because gas plants have lower CO2
emission rates).
498 See WORKING GROUP II TO'I'LE; SECOND AssEssmENT REPORT 01"I'llE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ox CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 184, at 14 (natural gas has lowest CO2 emissions per unit
energy of any fossil fuel, emitting only 14 kg of carbon per gigajoule (GJ) of energy while coal
produces 25 kg of carbon per GJ); INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 110, at 671. Oil,
though not as attractive as coal due to its price, is still being used for electricity generation and
also produces more carbon dioxide per unit of energy than natural gas. See id,
491 See generally Biewald, supra note 308, at 42-43; Milford, supra note 181 (retail competition
will likely dislodge some, but not majotity, of old, more polluting coal- and oil-Iircd generating
plants). Denmark began a CO2 tax in 1992, and the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden also now
have such a tax. See International Energy Agency, Climate Change Policy, supra note 189, at 21, 22.
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ity restructuring statutes may need to be coupled with additional statu-
torily enacted intervention mechanisms, probably at the federal level,
such as carbon taxes, mandatory CO2 emission limits or national re-
newable energy requirements.492 State-specified emission performance
standards, as allowed under the Massachusetts statute, will probably be
too weak a mechanism for addressing the CO2 problem.'" As critics of
environmental adder programs have observed, in a deregulated na-
tional electricity market consumers or power companies could simply
shift production to other, less-regulated states.'" Similarly, as critics of
adder programs suggested, emissions regulations applied solely to the
electricity industry, and not to substitutable energy products such as
gasoline or home heating oil, may have the undesirable effect of
encouraging consumers to shift their purchases away from low CO2
electricity to higher CO2 alternatives.495 Thus, in terms of CO2, consis-
tent emissions regulation should be applied to as many energy sources
as practicable—for example, through a carbon tax on all fuels or
similar mechanism—and not just to electricity. 496 Third, the subsidies
for renewable energy and energy efficiency measures497 are overly mod-
492
 See, e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists, supra note 380 (policies to combat global warm-
ing might include subsidizing renewable energy and requiring some percentage of its use in
electricity generation); Woolf & Biewald, supra note 107, at 70 (recommending renewable port-
folio standards for regions coupled with tradable renewables permit system for flexible imple-
mentation of standard); Biewald, supra note 308, at 92 (suggesting revenue-neutral pollution
taxes). Combining market approaches with regulation or absolute prohibition is not a new
strategy in dealing in commodities with severe unwanted side-effects. It is already used with scores
of commodities, cigarettes being one obvious exantple. Minors are not allowed to buy them at
any price (non-price limits on allocation). Cigarettes are taxed heavily for adult users, in part to
discourage consumption. Endless media campaigns and smoking ban regulations are employed
to curtail arid channel use. It would be inconceivable to use market price alone to keep cigarettes
out of the hands of minors; not even market price with a costly "adder" thrown on for minors.
Price is simply not the right regulatory or allocational mechanism for certain commodities in
certain contexts.
499 See infra note 994 and accompanying text.
494 See generally infra note 435.
195 See supra notes 929-30 and accompanying text.
496 See generally supra notes 929-32 and accompanying text.
497
	 Woolf & Biewald, supra note 107, at 70 (transition policies have focused on maintain-
ing historic levels of support for conservation and renewables, but to stabilize or reduce New
England's CO2 emissions these alternatives must play larger role than have to date). In terms of
mandating minimum usage of renewables, the Massachusetts restructuring statute mandates a
five percentage points increase in renewables over current levels by the end of 2010. See MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 25A, § 11F(a). Other than hydropower, current levels of renewable energy gen-
eration of electricity in New England, for example, are negligible. See Woolf & Biewald, supra
note 107, at 67 fig.4. Nationally, the combination of solar, tidal, wind, fuel cells, geothermal and
waste-fueled power accounted for about 2% of electricity generation in 1995; hydropower ac-
counted for about 9%. See International Energy Agency, supra note 110, at 671. In comparison,
Woolf & Biewald's 'zero carbon option," based on energy efficiency and renewably generated
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est. In the Massachusetts case, after an initial period they decrease over
time and are not guaranteed beyond five years. 1 "
In general, for critical resources, and for activities that pose the
risk of substantial, widespread or irrevocable harm, the best approach
may be to set environmental goals politically and then to use market
and non-market mechanisms to achieve those goals.'" The decision
between market and non-market mechanisms should not be based on
an ideological commitment to state regulation nor to an unregulated
market, but rather on which mechanism works best.. 5" For example,
with global warming we may need to set stringent national targets for
CO2 emissions and determine how much of that target must be met
from the power generation sector."' Then regulators could use market
mechanisms, like subsidies for energy efficiency or emissions taxes, or
non-market mechanisms, like mandatory emissions standards, to
achieve the target, depending on which works best and quickest." 2 In
broad outline, this is the approach recently agreed to at. the Climate
Change summit in Kyoto."
Finally, where catastrophic consequences like global warming are
threatened, or essential infrastructure like electricity is involved, plan-
ning should be done on the basis of long-term sustainability." In such
electricity, suggests that to stabilize CO2, New England would have to answer 17% of electricity
demand by means of renewables and conservation by the year 2010. See Woolf & Biewald, supra
note 107, at 69.
49° See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 25, §§ 19, 20 (1997). The surcharge on electricity to support
these subsidies totals 3.0 to 4.1 mills per kWh ($0.003-0.0041/kWb), depending on the year
involved. See id.
499 Compare Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforrning Environmental Law, 37 STAN.
L. Rtv. 1333, 1313, 1353 (1985) (level of pollution reduction is quintessentially political question
that should be answered by legislative process rather than cost-benelit analysis; method used to
achieve level should include marketable pollution rights), withJosxow, supra note 8, at 6 (optimal
emissions level for pollutant should be selected by balancing incremental benefits against incre-
mental costs of reduced emissions).
5°1/ See generally Coasc, supra note 2, at 18 (problem is one of choosing appropriate social
arrangement for given harmful effects; no reason to suppose government regulation called for
simply because market has failed; satisfactory policy can only come from study of how the market
and governments handle harmful effects); Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 499, at 1343, 1353.
561 See generally Biewald, supra note 308, at 42 (regional or national caps should be imple-
mented for carbon dioxide and other emissions with emission credit trading or alternatively
revenue•neutral pollution taxes; these mechanisms would use market forces to work out specific
abatement response).
562 See, e.g., supra note 501.
5°3 See, e.g., Lemonick, supra note 193, at 23 (Kyoto Protocol dictates 7% U.S.iCOs CM.95.0113
reduction below 1990 levels by year 2012); Tumulty, supra note 465, at 27 (U.S. administration
has ruled out use of taxes to achieve Kyoto target, but will propose subsidies aimed at increasing
energy efficiency).
51°4 See generally supra notes 357-74 and accompanying text.
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circumstances, society cannot afford the myopic five- to fifty-year hori-
zon and heavily discounted future of the current market approach.'"
For critical issues like global warming, decisions should be based not
just on the choices of individual market actors, not just on price, but
on the basis of society's undivided and long-term interests.506
N. CONCLUSION
From the earliest days of electricity regulation, the twin objectives
of least-cost power and environmental protection began to emerge in
the structure of the industry.'" The co-evolution of these social goals
began to surface distinctly with the passage of PURPA, and was clearly
evident in EPAct and in the restructuring statutes of states leading the
move towards deregulation, like Massachusetts and California.'m Least-
cost power was probably never the sole goal of electricity regulation.'"
But since the 1970s it certainly has not been. 51° It would thus be
inappropriate to assess new proposals for the industry solely in terms
of the cost of the electricity produced. The question instead, as we
renegotiate the legal bases for the industry, is how best to reconcile
society's goal of low-cost power with its goal of reducing the environ-
mental externalities of electricity production.
Some of those environmental goals may be achieved simply by the
functioning of the competitive market for least-cost power. The phase-
out of nuclear power, for example, ending additional radioactive waste,
is probably dictated simply by conventional price considerations."
Certain environmental impacts of the electricity industry, however, arc
unlikely to be addressed by the functioning of price in an unadjusted
market 512 Environmental impacts that are dispersed beyond the bor-
ders of the American consumer's transactions and consciousness, or
whose consequences arc sufficiently postponed into the future, like the
impact of CO2 emissions, are particularly unlikely to affect the price of
electricity.513 Thus, the market on its own will probably not address the
505 See generally supra notes 357-74 and accompanying text.
500 See, e.g., supra notes 357-74 and accompanying text.
507 See, e.g., supra note 77 and accompanying text.
5°8 See, e.g., supra notes 129, 143, 160-61 and accompanying text.
509 See, e.g., Calumet Service Co. v. City of Chilton, 135 N.W. 131, 140, 142 (Wise. 1912)
(describing goals of early Wisconsin electricity regulation as including "efficient service" and "best
service practicable").
510 See supra notes 89, 123, 143, 160-61 and accompanying text.
511 See supra note 80.
512 See, e,g., supra notes 337-417 and accompanying text.
513 See supra notes 357-93 and accompanying text.
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electricity sector's contribution to global warming nor other similar
externalities. 514 These failures of price consequently require legal in-
terventions to correct the shortcomings of the market.
States leading the deregulatory movement, like Massachusetts and
California, have incorporated many such interventions into their re-
structuring statutes in an effort to constrain and soften the environ-
mental impacts of electricity deregulation. 515 But more may be neces-
sary, particularly to deal with difficult externalities like the climate
impacts of CO2 emissions. 516 In developing further corrective interven-
tions in the market, both non-market mechanisms, like national CO2
emissions standards, and market-like mechanisms, such as carbon taxes
for most fuels, should be explored.5 ' 7
After setting emission reduction targets through domestic or in-
ternational political processes, Market-oriented mechanisms may be
particularly helpful in achieving those targets in the most cost-effective
manner. In the face of the repeated failure of price to properly guide
environmental practices in the electricity sector, however, policy-mak-
ers should be wary of conventional cost-benefit analysis as the sole
arbiter of appropriate actions on the environmental front. Some inter-
ventions in the electricity market that are not "cost-effective" may be
appropriate on other valid grounds and deserving of subsidy—preser-
vation of a healthy planet many centuries into the future, for exam-
ple.535 The market is, ultimately, simply a tool to achieve human ends.
It may be impossible to properly price the fair distribution of
burdens between rich nations and poor, the health of the planet 300
years hence or the preservation of the last surviving members of a
remote alpine wildflower species. Just because something has no price
does not mean it has no value.m 5 What the market cannot recognize,
we should still have the political wisdom to see. 520
RUDY PERKINS
514 See generally supra notes 337-417 and accompanying text.
515 See, e.g., supra notes 260-68 and accompanying text.
515 See supra notes 483-98 and accompanying text.
517 See P1COU, supra note 1, at 203 (no tax can provide a complete remedy for certain negative
activities, thus absolute prohibition is required); supra notes 499-502 and accompanying text.
515 See, e.g., supra notes 406-10 and accompanying text.
519 See, e.g., Massachusetts Eke. Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 643 N.E.M 1029,1032 (Mass.
1994) (DPU set externality value on "non-priced goods" such as damages to species and natural
systents).
910 See generally GORE, supra note 5, at 182-83.
